I Will Survive: Capital Taxation, Voter Turnout and Time Inconsistency

Matteo Bassi*
Toulouse School of Economics - GREMAQ

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Abstract

This paper reconsiders the debate around the political determination of capital taxation. In particular, we explain why capital taxes continue to survive in most OECD countries. The political economy literature on redistributive politics (Persson and Tabellini 2003) has emphasized the political power of the lower class: since labour income is more concentrated than capital income, the majority of the population benefits by overtaxing capital and undertaxing labour. However, evidence available for most developed countries shows that political participation (voting, lobbying, protesting etc.) is positively correlated with income.
A paradoxical result emerges: why do the upper class, who is politically more active and own most of the capital, still favour a positive capital tax? Hence, voters' income is not the sole relevant variable in the political determination of the capital tax. To justify this apparent puzzle we propose a model that incorporates time inconsistency *à la* Laibson in individual preferences We show that time inconsistent individuals are politically more homogeneous (or "single-minded") than exponential and, in order to finance a public transfer, they prefer to tax more capital income, instead of labor income, since their accumulated saving are below the planned (and optimal) level and the distortive effects of a higher capital tax are not only reduced but also delayed in time. Politicians find easier to please these voters by proposing a reduction of labor taxes and an increase of capital taxes.

Keywords: Political Economy, Multidimensional Voting, Capital Taxation, Redistribution, Hyperbolic Discounting.

JEL Classification: A12, D72, H21, H24, H31

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Contacts: Toulouse School of Economics, GREMAQ, Manufacture des Tabacs, Room MF018, 21, Allée de Brienne 31000 Toulouse (France).
Email:matteo.bassi@gmail.com

1 Introduction

Capital income taxes continue to represent a major source of fiscal revenues in most OECD countries: more than 20% of total tax proceeds (OECD, 2007) have reference to various form of capital taxation (corporate income tax, taxes on capital gains etc.)[1].

A common view in the economic literature is that the importance of capital income taxes has decreased over time: Auerbach (2006) shows that, in most G7 countries (except for France and Italy[2]), marginal taxes on capital have declined over the period 1973-2004 and have converged towards the same level.
A deeper analysis, however, shows that this trend has recently stopped: corporate taxes have actually risen as a share of total revenue over the last years (especially in the U.S. and Canada), and still account for 10-25% of total tax revenues. As stressed by Sorensen (2007) and Devereux et al. (2002), the decrease of the corporate income tax rate has been more than offset by the enlargement of the tax base[3], making the trend in marginal effective tax rates less obvious. If follows that, overall, corporate tax revenues have actually increased in most OECD countries[4]. Moreover, if other forms of capital taxation are considered, it is evident that the fiscal burden on capital remain significantly high in the world's leading economies.

Are positive levels of capital taxes justified from an economic standpoint? The normative literature has not achieved a unanimous consensus upon the optimal level of capital taxation: the Chamley- Judd (1986) result, *i.e.* capital taxes should be zero in the long run, does not hold if either redistributive concerns or more realistic assumptions about individuals' preferences are considered. The disagreement among economists upon how the tax burden should be split between capital and labor taxes is illustrated by Martin Feldstein in a post published on the weblog *marginalrevolution.com*, where he provides a simple example that sheds light on the harmful effects of capital taxation, and how a reform that reduces them can be Pareto-improving.

"Mr. X earns an additional $1,000. If X's marginal tax rate is 35%, he gets to keep $650. X saves $100 of this and spends the rest. If Mr. X invests these saving, he receives a return of 6% before tax and 3.9% after tax. With inflation of 2%, the 3.9% after-tax return is reduced to a real after-tax return of only 1.9%. If Mr. X is now 40 years old, this 1.9% real rate of return implies that the $100 of saving will be worth $193 in today's prices when he is 75. So his reward for the extra work is $550 of extra

[1]Capital taxation may take several forms, such as taxes on interests, dividends, capital gains, business profits, and on the value of the housing services enjoyed by owners. In this work, we will refer indistinctly as "taxes on capital income". However, it is really hard to measure them, since it is very complicated to estimate the part of total income that it is attribuable to capital.

[2]The center-left coalition proposed in his electoral program an increase of capital income tax rate from 12.5% to 20%. So far, however, such reform remains unapproved.

[3]For instance, governments have eliminated special deductions and generous asset depreciation rules. This strategy (the *tax-cut-cum-base-broadening* philosophy, very popular in the 80s and 90s) was encouraged by the practice of profit shifting and improvement in the ability of avoid taxation by corporations.

[4]In the U.S., for example, corporate taxes accounted for a higher share of federal revenues in 2005 than in any year since 1979 (Auerbach, 2006, based on OECD data).

consumption now and $193 of extra consumption at age 75. But if the tax rate on the income from saving is reduced to 15%, the 6% interest rate would yield 5.1% after tax and 3.1% after both tax and inflation. And with a 3.1% real return, X's $100 of extra saving would grow to $291 in today's prices instead of just $193" (Martin Feldstein, *www.marginalrevolution.com*).

This example illustrates two important aspects of capital taxation. The first one concerns the effect of capital taxes on welfare and GDP: capital taxes waste potential output, reduce welfare by decreasing the reward for work and saving and distort the allocation between saving and future consumption. Moreover, by increasing the cost of capital, taxes affect the quantity of investments made by firms, through effects on the relative returns to risk-taking. Finally, a fall of taxes on capital gains can stimulate higher-risk investment such as in startup or venture capital businesses. Feldstein concludes that lowering the tax rate on interest income, and increasing the labor income tax as to keep revenues constant, could increase total welfare. The second aspect concerns the political determination of capital taxes. Why does Mr. X, who is supposed to be rational, vote for parties that propose fiscal platforms distorted towards capital taxation? If lowering capital taxation would be beneficial for both taxpayers *and* the government, why do we still observe positive taxes? In a simple political economy voting model, office-seeking candidates should propose policy platforms that please the majority of voters, namely low (possibly zero) taxes on capital income. Many papers try to justify why capital taxes remains high. Some of them have proposed a "redistributive" explanation: capital income is more concentrated than labor income. Hence, the majority gains from shifting a larger share of the tax burden to capital. This idea presuppose that poor are more powerful and better organized than rich in the political process, and thus they are able to impose their preferences to the losing minority. However, it is well known that rich individuals are much more active in the voting process than poor people[5], and that are less interested in redistribution. Therefore, the "redistributive" explanation is not robust to the empirical evidence and the question: "Why does capital income taxation still survive?" remains unanswered.

This paper tries to solve this apparent puzzle by proposing a model that mixes economic, political and behavioral considerations. We propose a multidimensional voting model with opportunistic parties and voters that differ along two dimensions: *productivity*, as to capture the fact that low productivity individuals save less than high productivity ones, and *time inconsistency*. The second source of heterogeneity represents a substantial departure from the traditional idea that voters display perfect rationality. This assumption is not new: several studies have tried to incorporate in a classical economic framework various forms of irrationality in individuals' behavior. In particular, there is a large literature on economics and psychology (see Laibson, 1997 for a review) that emphasizes the relevance of time inconsistency in consumers' preferences, especially whenever there exists a temporal gap between the costs and the benefits

[5]Rich people contribute more in political campaigns, have a higher turnout and have more resources to devote to lobbying activities. See section 4 for further details.

associated with a given action.

Formally, to capture the fact that individuals have a higher discount rate in the short-run than in the long-run, we adopt the following intertemporal utility function (Strotz 1956, Phelps and Pollacks 1968, Laibson 1997):

$$u_0(.) + \beta \sum_{t=1}^{T} \delta^t u_t(.) \tag{1}$$

where β represents the short term psychological discount factor, and δ is the time-consistent, long term one. Therefore, the discount function is 1 at $t = 0$ and to $\beta\delta^t$ for $t = 1, 2, ..., T$. It follows that implied discount factor between now and the next period is $\beta\delta$, whereas that between any two periods in the future is δ: between today and the next period the discount factors is declining, but it is constant thereafter. The above formulation implies that an individual is modeled as a collection of selves: present selves overweight current payoffs compared to future ones, giving rise to a conflict between preferences of different intertemporal selves. A time inconsistent individual makes plans that future selves will systematically change. The empirical relevance of this behavioral assumption has been widely tested (Ainsle 1992) through experiments, simulations and real data: Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998 and 2004), using data on credit card borrowing and consumption-income comovement, test whether individuals actually behave patiently in the long term and impatiently in the short term. They find hat the hypothesis that the short term discount factor β coincides with the long run one, δ, should be reject. Moreover, the estimated values for the β and δ are, respectively, around 40% and 4%, thus confirming that the hyperbolic model better explains individual behavior.

Together with these behavioral considerations, our model takes explicitly into account several aspects of the political science literature so far excluded from economic analysis: we consider explicitly that political participation is increasing with income and some individuals are excluded from the political game. By taking into account real turnouts in political elections, we show that is not true anymore that poor are able to impose their preferred capital taxes to the rich minority.

In such a framework, we show that, when voting over the optimal tax mix, both poor and time inconsistent agents agree to keep labor income tax as lowest as possible and to increase capital taxation. The lower class owns less capital, and thus favor more capital taxes. However, this group participates less in the political process and, to implement its preferred policy, it needs to form a coalition with time inconsistent individuals, who share, *for any income level*, the same preference about the allocation of the tax burden between capital and income taxation. More precisely, their preference for higher capital tax has two sources: first, a higher after tax income has only a negligible effect on hyperbolic saving: they will continue to consume "too much "instead of saving at a higher return. Second, since labor supply is chosen period-by-period, and thus is not affected by time inconsistency, an increase of the labor tax today (together with a lower capital tax tomorrow) implies a first-order reduction in hyperbolic current

utility and only a second-order increase in their future utility (since saving are lower than optimal and taxation of capital income is delayed in time). By taxing capital, time inconsistent rich individuals favor redistribution: from time inconsistent to time consistent individuals

Opportunistic politicians maximize their probability of being elected by increasing the tax on savings and lowering taxes on labor income, as to exploit the single mindedness of hyperbolic and poor voters. In equilibrium, both candidates propose the same policy vector, that entails a fiscal burden distorted towards capital taxation, but not simply because of the political power of poor individuals, but also because high taxation of capital income is preferred by time inconsistent individuals. .

The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we present stylized facts about capital taxation, as to demonstrate that they represent a substantial part of tax revenues. In section 3 we review the economic literature on capital taxation, both from a normative and a positive point of view. In section 4 we present some stylized facts about political participation. In section 5 we present our basic model; In section 6 and 7 we solve the model both for individuals (exponential and time consistent) and for the two parties. Section 8 concludes.

2 Stylized Facts about Capital Taxation

The aim of this section is to show that capital income taxes remain substantially positive in almost all OECD countries.

According to Carey and Rabesona (2004), the average level of capital income taxation was around 50% in 2002. Data in Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that, in a sample of 14 OECD countries, the average effective tax rates on capital and labor were about the same (around 38%) over the period 1991-1995. In the same period, in U.S. and U.K. capital taxes were higher than labor taxes.

Capital taxes concern both corporations and individuals. For the former, as stressed in the introduction, taxes on corporate income (the most important form of capital tax) have fallen in the period 1980-2004 (Figure 1), but the proceeds of this tax have substantially increased, except in Japan, Germany and UK (Figure 2). Since profit shares in the GDP have remained almost the same throughout that period (Sorensen 2007), this increase in revenues was mainly due to the enlargement of the tax base[6]. Therefore, in almost all countries, the aggregate effective corporate taxation has increased.

The evidence for personal capital taxes is more difficult to present: the difficulty comes from the fact that official OECD statistics do not decompose the total revenue from personal income taxes into tax

[6]The strategy of increasing effective tax rates by broadening the tax base, is still very popular: in november 2007, Democrat representative Charles B. Rangel, head of the House Ways and Means Committee, proposed a bill that would radically change the tax code (the *mother of all reforms*); in particular, the bill proposed a reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35 to 30 percent, but this reduction would be fully paid for by a series of measures to broaden the corporate tax base (repeal of a special deductions etc.). The reform, however, was aborted.



Figure 1: Corporate Tax Rates (*Source*: Sorensen, 2007)

falling on capital income and tax levied on labour income. Figure 3 reports some estimates presented in Sorensen (2007) about the tax structure and the allocation among different sources (capital, labor and property): it emerges that personal taxes on capital income contribute only between 5 and 10 percent of total tax revenue in OECD most countries. On the other hand, the table shows that corporate taxation is a more significant revenue raiser than the personal capital income tax. The importance of property taxes, a mix that includes taxes on the ownership and transfer of real and financial assets, varies quite a lot across countries.

In the rest of this section, we will focus on the structure of capital taxation in the United States, where more data are available, and the puzzle between capital taxes and voting behavior is more evident. In the U.S. individuals and corporations pay capital income tax on the net total of all their capital proceeds just as they do on other sorts of income.

Back to 1963, the highest marginal rate of personal (capital and labor) income tax was 93 percent. This rate was reduced, but even as recently as 1980, the top income tax rate was 70 percent and interest and dividend, and the corporate tax rate was around 46 per cent. Moreover, capital gains tax rates were significantly increased in the 1969 and 1976 *Tax Reform Acts*: the minimum tax rate for such gains was increased up to 15 percent, whereas the maximum rate reached 40 percent (Auten 1999). In 1978, Congress reduced capital gains tax rates by eliminating the minimum tax on excluded gains and increasing the exclusion to 60 percent, thereby reducing the maximum rate to 28 percent. The 1981 tax rate reductions further reduced capital gains rates to a maximum of 20 percent. The *Tax Reform Act* signed by president Reagan in 1986 changed substantially the tax code: corporate tax rate was reduced to 35 percent (although, as we have seen the tax base was broaden), but the exclusion of long-term gains was repealed, and the maximum tax rate for short term capital gains was raised to 28 percent (33 percent



Figure 2: Corporate Tax Revenues (*Source*: Sorensen, 2007)

for taxpayers subject to phaseouts). As an example, Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of nominal and effective tax rates for capital gains for the period 1984-1995: it is pretty clear that effective tax rates increased during this period.

Until 2003, no substiantial reforms in the tax treatment of capital gains were adopted. In 2003, the tax rate for individuals was lowered for the so-called "long-term" capital gains, *i.e.* gains on assets held for over one year before being sold , and increased for "short-term" capital gains. For the former, the tax rate was reduced to 15% (or to 5% for individuals in the lowest income tax brackets). On the other hand, the latter are taxed at the (higher) ordinary income tax rate. This reduced tax rate was scheduled to expire in 2008 but the *Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act*, signed by President Bush in 2006, has extended this reduced tax rate through 2010. However, after that date, taxes will revert to the rates in effect before 2003, which were generally 25%[7]. Concerning corporate taxes, the effective average tax rate in the U.S. is around 40%.

In this section we have presented stylized facts about capital taxation: data for most OECD countries show that *effective* capital taxes, and in particular corporate taxes, remain high. The same appears to be true for the taxation of long term capital gains, since recently implemented tax cuts are temporary and have a clear electoral motive.

In the following sections we try to understand whether these empirical observations are in line with the economic literature on optimal capital income taxes, and how the interactions between politicians and voters in the political arena may lead to the observed capital taxes.

[7]Given that the empirical evidence show that voters of the Republican party are in average richer than Democrats (Krugman 2007, Bartels 2007), this reform could appear, at first sight, harmful for Republican voters.

Country	Taxes on capital			Other taxes				
	Personal capital income taxes[a]	Taxes on corporations	Taxes on property	Personal labour income taxes[b]	Social security taxes	Payroll taxes	Taxes on goods and services	Other taxes
United States	9.4	8.7	12.0	25.3	26.3	–	18.3	–
Japan	2.5	14.2	10.0	15.3	37.7	–	20.0	0.3
Germany	8.0	4.5	2.5	14.8	40.7	–	29.2	0.0
France	5.8	6.3	7.6	11.2	37.1	2.6	25.6	3.6
Italy	10.2	6.9	6.1	15.2	30.3	–	26.4	5.5
United Kingdom	6.6	8.1	12.0	22.1	18.8	–	32.0	–
Canada	4.2	11.4	10.2	30.9	15.2	2.0	25.9	0.2
Australia	7.2	18.2	8.7	33.0	–	4.4	28.5	–
Austria	5.8	5.4	1.3	18.2	33.9	6.1	28.2	0.9
Belgium	9.5	8.0	3.9	21.1	31.3	–	25	0.0
Czech Republic	3.8	12.4	1.1	8.9	42.3	–	31.2	0.0
Denmark	7.1	9.7	3.8	43.6	2.4	0.4	32.7	0.0
Finland	6.1	8.1	2.6	24.4	26.8	–	31.7	0.1
Greece	6.8	9.4	4.4	7.0	34.7	–	37.1	–
Ireland	4.4	11.9	6.9	23.0	15.0	0.6	37.8	–
Koren	1.0	14.3	11.3	12.6	20.7	0.2	36.3	3.5
Netherlands	5.4	8.2	5.3	11.0	36.9	–	32.0	0.4
New Zealand	9.8	17.2	5.0	34.2	-	–	33.8	–
Norway	4.7	22.6	2.6	18.8	21.6	–	29.7	–
Portugal	1.9	8.3	4.6	14.0	31.8	–	38.6	0.5
Spain	3.2	9.8	8.1	14.5	34.8	–	28.0	0.4
Sweden	5.3	6.3	3.1	26.1	28.4	4.7	25.8	0.1
Switzerland	3.1	8.6	8.5	31.7	24.4	–	23.7	–

Figure 3: Tax Structures in OECD countries in 2004 (percent of total tax revenues; *Source*: Sorensen, 2007)

3 Literature Review on Capital Taxation

3.1 Normative Theories

What is the optimal level of the capital income tax? Does a reform that replace capital taxation with other forms of taxation increase or decrease total welfare? Normative public economic literature has tried to answer these questions, but so far unanimity among economists has not been reached. In this section we try to summarize the main findings about this topic[8].

There is a presumption among many economists that capital income taxes raise revenue in a less efficient way than wage or consumption taxes. Many authors have shown [9] that capital taxes are desirable only in the short run: after some initial transition in which savings are discouraged, the long run capital tax has to converge to zero. The intuition behind this result is related to the classical Ramsey (1927) model; by interpreting consumption at different dates as different commodities, and the capital tax as a selective commodity tax on future consumption, the uniform taxation result applies: capital income should be taxed in the initial period, where the relative price distortion caused by capital income taxation is finite, but never in the following periods, since the size of the distortion increases. This result continues to hold if we assume that individuals have to make a labor supply decision, provided that their utility function is separable between labor and consumption (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976)[10].

[8]The background for this section is given by Auerbach and Hines (1998), Barnheim (1999) and Sorensen (2007).

[9]See, for instance, Diamond (1973), Auerbach (1978), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Judd (1985 and 1999), Chamley (1986), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994).

[10]The Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem is a particular case of the Corlett-Hague (1953) rule: a commodity tax system that minimize the deadweight loss should impose higher taxes on commondities that are more complementary to leisure, since

Year	Total Positive Realized Capital Gains ($ billion)	Taxes Paid on Capital Gains ($ billion)	Effective Tax Rate on Capital Gains (%)	Gains as Percent of Gross Domestic Product (%)	Maximum Tax Rate on Long-Term Gains (%)
1984	140,5	21,5	15,3	3,7	20
1985	172	26,5	15,4	4,3	20
1986	327,7	52,9	16,1	7,7	20
1987	148,4	33,7	22,7	3,3	28
1988	162,6	38,9	23,9	3,3	28
1989	154	35,3	22,9	2,9	28
1990	123,8	27,8	22,5	2,2	28
1991	111,6	24,9	22,3	2	28,9
1992	126,7	29	22,9	2,1	28,9
1993	152,3	36,1	23,7	2,4	29,2
1994	152,7	36,2	23,7	2,2	29,2
1995	180,1	44,3	24,6	2,5	29,2

Figure 4: Capital Taxation in the U.S. (1984-1995)

This Chamley-Judd result, however, relies on several simplifying assumptions: preferences should be intertemporally separable and isoelastic; capital markets are perfectly competitive and complete *i.e.* individuals may freely reallocate consumption over time by borrowing and lending; there is no uncertainty over the labor income. Finally, it is assumed that the time horizon of the representative individual coincides with the one of the planner[11]. Removing these assumptions, positive[12] capital taxes may become optimal. If borrowing constraints, and/or imperfections in the labor and credit markets exist, than it may be optimal to levy a capital tax even if the horizon is infinite (Aiyagari, 1993 and Chamley, 2001). If labor income is subject to stochastic shocks every period, the proceeds of a capital tax may be used to make lump-sum transfers from high consumption states to low consumption states, in order to insure individuals against low-consumption states in absence of market-provided insurances. Along this line of research, the New Dynamic Public Finance literature (see Kocherlakota 2006, for a review) has recently reconsidered the determination of the optimal tax burden in a dynamic framework, with credit markets imperfections and random shocks on individuals' productivity. The main result that emerges is that the optimal wedge between marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of transformation is different from zero, *i.e.* saving should be discouraged. The optimal intertemporal allocation can be implemented using a tax system that is linear in current wealth, but equal to zero in expected and aggregate terms.

this will minimize the tax induced subsitution towards leisure. Therefore, if future consumption is more complementary to leisure than present consumption, the former should be reduced through a tax on savings. Since ther is no evidence whether future consumption is more or less substitutable for leisure than present consumption, most economist assume the same degree of substitutability, and therefore a zero optimal capital income tax.

[11] In a recent paper, Abel (2007) challenges the Chamley-Judd result without a substantial depart from the basic model: in an economy with identical infinitely-lived households, if the purchasers of capital are allowed to deduct capital expenditures from the capital income tax base, then a constant and positive tax rate on capital income is non-distortionary. The tax system that implements the optimal allocation consists of a positive tax rate on capital income and a zero tax rate on labor income, the opposite result found by Chamley and Judd.

[12] Or even negative taxes (subsidies). See Judd (1997).

If we consider more realistic models in which consumers have a shorter time horizon than the planner (as in OLG models *à la* Diamond), a positive capital tax may be optimal. This is the case when we also assume that future consumption is more complementary to leisure than present consumption, as shown by Erosa and Gervais (2002). Within this framework, redistributive concerns may also provide a rational for positive capital taxes: Krusell et al. (2000) and Salanié (2003) extend the Atkinson-Stiglitz model to a dynamic framework to show that a positive capital income tax is indeed optimal. To be more precise, they assume that saving for future consumption induce capital accumulation and influence pre-tax factor incomes. If skilled labor is more complementary to capital than unskilled labor, it follows that the proceeds of a capital tax that discourages saving can be used to redistribute income in favour of low-income earners, given that the distortion induced by this tax is more than compensated by the welfare gain of a more equitable distribution of income [13]. Finally, a linear tax on capital income may be necessary if the government is not able to observe (and thus to tax directly) inherited individual wealth. The proceed of this (indirect) tax on wealth can be used to redistribute income(Cremer et al., 2003, and Boadway et al. 2000).

Even if a tax on capital income would be optimal, it is also possible that it originates substantial welfare losses that can removed by replacing such taxes with more efficient forms of taxation (labor or consumption taxes).

Feldstein (1978) shows that replacing a capital tax with a labor tax that yields the same revenues increases welfare by approximately 18%. These conclusion are robust also in a general equilibrium framework: Chamley (1981) and Judd (1987), in models with infinite-lived individuals, show that the deadweight loss of taxing capital is high (around 11% of total revenue, when the capital tax rate is 30%. Welfare losses are substantial also if in a OLG framework, where the optimal capital tax is positive. Simulation in Diamond (1970) and Summers (1981) show that steady state welfare would increase by 12% if capital taxation were replaced with consumption taxes, and by 5% if were replaced by a labor income tax[14]. Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Skinner (1983) improve upon Summers' analysis, comparing not only steady states welfare levels, but also changes in welfare along the transiction path, and confirm that a reform that replaces the capital tax with a consumption tax would increase steady state welfare by roughly 6% (although the utility of the oldest initial cohorts would decline). However, if the capital income tax is replaced by a wage tax, steady state welfare would *decline* by 4%, although the utility of the oldest initial cohort would increase.

The review of the literature has shown that, from an efficiency standpoint, capital taxation is not

[13] On the other hand, if this complementarity is not taken into account, capital accumulation does not affect the pre-tax distribution of wages, and thus a zero capital income tax is still optimal, provided that utility is separable in consumption and leisure (Ordover and Phelps, 1979)

[14] It is important to notice that Summers' analisys suffers from several drawbacks: first, he considers only the steady state and not the transition path following the tax reform, and thus he negliges the negative distributional effects that reduce transitional generations' welfare. Second, labor supply is inelastic, and thus the optimal tax rate is zero by assumption.

desirable, provided that some simplifying (but not trivial) assumption are satisfied. However, once redistributive concerns are taken into account, the optimal capital tax may be positive. However, in any case, a reform that replace the capital income tax with other forms of taxation (on wages or consumption) is welfare-improving.

3.2 Positive Theories

In this section, we review the political economy literature on capital taxation; the objective is to understand how the level of capital taxation is determined in the political arena. Several papers have tried to justify the existence of positive capital taxes but, in our opinion, none of them is able to provide a fully satisfactory answer. We classify these explanations into four groups.

First, capital taxes may exist because for a government it represents an efficient way to collect revenues. More precisely, taxing capital income induce only a second order distortion on individuals' saving. Politicians, in order to keep total tax proceeds constant, may refrain from eliminating capital taxation, if the increase of the after tax return of saving does not boost capital accumulation, but only decreases total revenues. The relevance of this explanation depends on the sign and the magnitude of the *interest elasticity of saving*, that measure how responsive are saving to a change in their after-tax return. From a theoretical standpoint, the uncompensated elasticity of saving can be either positive or negative (Bernheim, 1999), so saving can rise or fall in response to a decrease of the tax rate. If individual preferences can be represented through a CES utility function, the interest elasticity of saving depend on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption: saving rises (*resp.* falls) in response to cut in the tax rate if the elasticity of substitution is high (*resp.* small). Unfortunately, the empirical literature[15] is not able to provide a direct estimate for the value of this elasticity. Given these difficulties, another empirical approach has been followed: in particular, scholars have tried to compute how the introduction of tax-deferred savings account[16] (IRA and 401(k), for instance) has modified the choice of optimal saving. More precisely, we would like to know how much less would contributors have saved in absence of these accounts. Despite the huge number of papers on this topic, the answer is still undetermined. Contributions to IRAs were substantial, but it is not clear whether these savings are "new" or simple displacements from other forms of savings (Bernheim, 1999). The evidence about the sign of elasticity of substitution is so mixed, and sometimes so contradicting, that we can not conclude without any doubt that a lower tax rate on capital will increase/decrease/keep constant individual saving and therefore we can not infer that individuals and politicians prefer to tax capital as to minimize distortions[17].

[15] See Bernheim (1999), Hubbard and Skinner (1996), and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996).

[16] IRAs and 401(k) were introduced by the U.S. goverment in the 70s, to boost individual saving: these accounts feature tax deductible contributions up to a certain limit, tax-free accumulation, taxation of principal and interest on withdrawal, and penalties for early withdrawal. After an initial popularity (20 billions $ in the 1986), contributions fell to less than 10 billions $).

[17] Furthermore, as stressed by Feldstein (2006 and 2007), even if the interest elasticity of substitution were effectively

A second political justification for capital taxation is related to the lack of credibility of politicians (the *capital levy problem*; see Fischer, 1980): the announcement of a lower capital tax rate would not be credible, since the elasticity of saving already accumulated is zero. In equilibrium, capital is highly taxed, more than would be efficient for the representative agent. Such a strategy, however, does not work if we consider a repeated model, where politicians care not only about winning the current election, but also maintaining their reputation: announcing low capital taxes before elections and taxing capital later will destroy politicians' credibility for the future.

A third explanation is the *strategic political delegation phenomenon*: rational voters, anticipating that the policy-maker will face, after the elections, a different set of incentive constraints, should elect someone with different preferences from their own. Agents overcome the capital levy problem by using another government at their advantage. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, since it is know that most of voters have an ideological bias towards a political party, and quite rarely they are willing to modify their vote to tie the government's hands.

The forth political explanation for positive levels of capital taxation relies on redistributive concerns, which may also justify capital taxation from a normative standpoint. This view is proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2003): when voting over the composition of the tax burden, the lower class has more political power than the rich one, since labour income is less concentrated than capital income, and poor are generally the majority of the population. Therefore, the winning majority is composed by poor individuals that benefit from more redistribution, and the policy vector that wins the voting game entails overtaxing capital income and undertaxing labour income. However, this model have very little empirical support because, in real life elections, even if rich represent a minority of the electorate, they are more involved in the political process than the lower class, and *ex ante* not interested in redistribution. Since rich own more capital, the resulting positive level of capital taxation is puzzling.

None of the political theories reviewed is fully able to explain, in our opinion, the high level of capital taxation observed in the real world: considering more realistic assumptions about individuals' preferences and some facts about how elections really work, will help us to understand this puzzle.

4 The Political Science Literature

The political economy literature has so far ignored at least three important stylized facts well known by political science scholars. Incorporating these real world facts into economics would help us to better understand how decisions are taken it the political arena.

zero, the negative effects of capital taxation on saving would remain: a tax not only affects *current* consumption, but also *future* consumption that could be actually bought by saving. Feldstein provides the following example: assume that in absence of capital taxes, the return of savings is 10%. If the capital tax is 50%, the net return is only 5%. For an individual who saves at 45 years old and dissaves at 75, each dollar saved increased future consumption to 17$ whereas, with the tax, one dollar today will buy only 4,3$, with a decline of 75%, for a *given* level of saving.

First, *not all individuals participate actively in the political process*[18]: turnouts (defined as percent of the voting population, *i.e.* everyone above the minimal age for voting, usually 18 years), are much lower than 100%: the average turnout is around 77% in European countries, and much lower in the United States (around 50%) and in Latin America countries, where it averages 54%. While turnout across the globe rose steadily between 1945 and 1980 (increasing from 61% in the 1940s to 68% in the 1980s), since then it has dipped back to 64% today, despite the increase in educational levels and economic well being[19] (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 2007). Many reasons can justify this tendency[20]: first, burdensome registration procedures may represent a major institutional deterrent to voting. This is true for the U.S. (Rosenstone 1993), but less for European countries, that have less complicated voting procedures, but have also experienced dramatic declines in voter turnouts (Topf 1995). The salience of the issues may play an important role in determing participation: political elections usually have a higher turnout than administrative and local elections, which are perceived to be less important. Third, the attractiveness of parties and candidates influences turnout: many countries have recently experienced a growing disbelief towards politics and a lower interest for political activity. Finally, institutional mechanisms affect turnout: according to Lijphart (1994), the choice of the electoral system may have effects on voters' participation. In particular, Proportional Representation (PR) increases voting participation, by giving citizens more choices and by eliminating the phenomenon of *wasted votes* (votes cast for losing candidates or for candidates that win with big majorities), which is typical of systems that use Single-Member districts. The frequency of elections may also negatively influence turnout (Boyd 1989), since it increases the cost of voting.

Whichever the reasons for low turnouts are, this fact would not represent a issue if non-participation was randomly and evenly distributed among social classes: however, participations is highly unequal, and it is systematically biased in favor of those with higher incomes, greater wealth and better education, against less advantaged citizens (Lijphart 1997). This leads us to the second stylized fact: *political participation increases with income*[21]. A common idea about political participation is that self-interest is the main motivation for voting: those who have a higher stake in the political process should be the more active. It follows that poor individuals, who in principle benefit more from public policies and

[18] In our terminology, the "political process" includes not only voting, but also broader form of political participation, both conventional (working in election campaigns, contribution ot parties or candidates, working informally in the community, lobbying) and unconventional (participation in demonstrastions, boycotts, rents and tax strikes, occupations).

[19] Countries with low literacy rates do not necessarily have a lower turnout: there is no significant statistical correlation between education level and voter turnout, although highly literate countries, on average, have a higher level of political participation. Nevertheless, high illiteracy countries such as Angola and Ethiopia have achieved high turnout rates.

[20] Following the "voting paradox" theory, the striking result that should be explained is not why 50% of citizens do not vote, but why there is still a 50% of them who continues to do it, since their vote is far from being decisive and not voting is seen as a completely rational activity. However, we take as given the fact the voter's turnout is low, and we do not anayze the determinants of voting.

[21] At the beninning of 20th century, with the adoption of universal suffrage in many countries, political analysts were convinced that the intellectual élite would have preferred not to vote, since its vote would drown among the votes of the mass. Quite soon, empirical studies showed that status and voting were positively, and not negatively, correlated.

redistributive transfers, should be more involved in the political process. However, there is an old and vast empirical evidence that does not confirm this myth[22]: for instance, Gosnell (1927) found that turnout increased with economic status and that "the more schooling the individual has the more likely he is to register and vote in elections". The same clear pattern was reported also in Arneson (1925) and Tingsten (1937), who reviewed a large number of elections in Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Austria, U.S. and Sweden and formulated the general rule that "voting frequency rises with rising social standard". The bias is especially strong in the U.S., where "no matter which form citizen participation takes, the pattern of class equality is unbroken (Lijpart 1997)", and where, over time, the level of voting participation and class inequality are strongly and negatively linked.A study of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2007), show that, for a sample of OECD countries, those who voted in the current election have a higher average income than those who did not. A notable exception to this trend is the participation of senior citizens specifically with regard to Social Security (Campbell (2002)): in this case, participation *decreases* as income rises, in part because lower-income citizens are more dependent on the program.

The positive correlation between income and participation leads us to the third fact: *politicians tend to favor the opinion of rich.* Given that the upper class participates more actively in the political debate, it is not surprising that, as stressed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), "*inequalities in political participation are likely to be associated with inequalities in governmental responsiveness*". Bartels (2005) provides some empirical evidence to support this intuition. In his paper, the responsiveness of U.S. senators to the preferences of rich, middle-class, and poor constituents is investigated: senators appear to be considerably more responsive to the opinions of affluent constituents than to the opinions of middle-class constituents, while the opinions of poor constituents have no apparent statistical effect on their senators' roll call votes. The sign of the bias is the same both for Democrats and Republican senators; however, the latter appear to be more than twice as responsive as the former to the ideological views of rich constituents.

Forth, *there is a difference in voter turnout between young and old voters*, not only between rich and poor: old's participation rate is higher that young individuals with the same characteristics (income level, education etc.). Despite their low resource levels, senior citizens in the U.S. participate at very high rates. For example, according to the National Election Study, seniors (aged more than 64) were 7% more likely to vote than their young counterpart.

Another fact, although less clear and more controversial in the political literature, is the relationship between income level and the ideological view of the voter: a persistent myth is that rich people vote Democratic, while working stiffs vote Republican[23]. However, according to data in Krugman (2007)

[22] "*[...] Low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout. This pattern is so clear, strong and well known in the U.S. that it does not need to be elabored further*". (Lijphart, 1997)

[23] According to MSNBC's political journalist Tucker Carlson: "*Here's the fact that nobody ever, ever mentions — Democrats win rich people. Over 100,000 in income, you are likely more than not to vote for Democrats. People never*

and Bartels (2006), the truth is just the opposite[24]. According to 2006 exit polls, among individuals with less than \$100,000 (78% of the voting population), 55% voted for Democratic Party, and 43% for Republicans. For, individuals with more than \$100,000, 47% voted Democrats and 52% Republicans. A 4-point difference between top and bottom became a 14-point difference.

Having in mind these facts, it emerges that poor are more or less excluded from the political arena. They have lower turnouts and are less involved in other political activities (lobbying, campaign financing etc.). It is not surprising that office-seeking parties try to please the more involved in the political life, as Bartels (2006) has stressed. But this is in contrast with the evidence presented in previous sections: if the active electorate is composed mostly by wealthy individuals who own most of the capital in the economy, and political parties are sensitive to rich's preferences, then why is tax burden distorted towards capital taxation? More interestingly, capital taxation appear to be higher than labor income taxation in the U.S. than in Europe, in spite the fact that in the U.S. that we observe a more intense positive relationship between income and participation. Does it mean that U.S. citizens vote against their interests? Is there really a *Myth of the Rational Voter* (Caplan, 2007) and individuals approve bad policies just because they are misinformed by politicians and unable to fully understand the economic implications of political actions?

We still believe that voters are rational, but their behavior can be better described with a model with bounded rationality. In particular, the form of limited rationality we consider here is *time inconsistency*. The puzzling result about capital taxation can be perfectly understood through a simple political economy model that embeds more realistic assumptions about individuals preferences: some individuals display a higher preference for present utility, whereas others not and it is safe to assume that this bias toward the present is not correlated to income.

5 The Economic Environment

We consider a three-periods OLG model; in every period, three generations are alive: *young, middle aged* and *old*. Population grows at a constant rate g. The size of each generation is denoted, respectively, with $n^y = (1+g)^2 n^o$, $n^{ma} = (1+g) n^o$ and n^o .

When young and middle aged, individuals supply labor l and save for post retirement consumption, s: the endowment of units of time is normalized to one. A old individual is retired: he consumes his accumulated saving and receive a transfer P, that represent an instrument of intergenerational and

point that out. Rich people vote liberal. I don't know what that's all about".

[24]In a post published in his own weblog, economist Paul Krugman states: *"There's a weird myth among the commentary that rich people vote Democratic. There's another strange thing about that myth: the notion that income class doesn't matter for voting, or that it's perverse, has spread even as the actual relationship between income and voting has become much stronger. And the fact that people with higher incomes are more likely to vote Republican has been consistently true since 1972. The interesting question is why so many pundits know for a fact something that simply ain't so".*

intragenerational redistribution, and it is financed through the proceeds of two proportional taxes[25]: on labor [26], τ_ω, and on capital income, τ_K.

Utility of consumption is expressed by the increasing and concave utility function $u(.)$, while the disutility of effort is expressed by $v(.)$, with $v'(.) > 0$ and $v''(.) > 0$. Finally, let r be the constant and exogenous gross return on wealth.

Within each generation, individuals differ with respect to two dimensions: *productivity level* and the *degree of time inconsistency.*

For the former, we assume that, at the beginning of his life, each individual is assigned with a productivity ω, which remains the same in the next period: ω can assume only two values, ω^P (poor) and ω^R (rich), with the obvious ranking $\omega^R > \omega^P$. Each income group represents, respectively, a fraction ρ^P and ρ^R (or, alternatively, $1-\rho^P$) of each group, with $\rho^P > \rho^R$. The mean wage of the economy is $\bar{\omega} = \rho^R\omega^R + \rho^P\omega^P$.

The second source of heterogeneity comes from the bias toward the present that certain individuals display in intertemporal trade-offs. More precisely, time inconsistency is such that the psychological short-term discount factor β between two subsequent periods is lower for time inconsistent than for time consistent individuals: $\beta^{TI} < \beta^{TC} = 1$). Furthermore, we consider *sophisticated* time inconsistent individuals: they are aware of their self-control issues but, in absence of any commitment device[27], they are not able to stick with their optimal plans. On the other hand, time consistent (or *exponential*) individuals can implement optimal consumption paths. In other words, we exclude from our analysis *naive* individuals, who are not aware of time inconsistency issues. The unique intertemporal decision iin our economy is the saving choice: as we show below, time inconsistent old agents experience a drop in post-retirement consumption, due to overconsumption when young and middle aged. On the other hand, labor supply, being decided period by period, is not influenced by this bias towards the present. Time consistent and time inconsistent individuals represents, respectively, a fraction λ^{TC} and λ^{TI} of each income group.[28] Therefore, in each generation, we have four group of individuals: poor time consistent (a fraction $\rho^P\lambda^{TC}$ of the population), rich time consistent ($\rho^R\lambda^{TC}$), poor time inconsistent $\left(\rho^P\lambda^{TI}\right)$ and rich time inconsistent $\left(\rho^P\lambda^{TI}\right)$.

Taking into account the two sources of heterogeneity and the three generations, twelve groups coexist

[25] P can represent either a pension transfer awarded only to retirees, or a public good that increase only old's consumption: health care, for instance, whose consumption increase with age.

[26] If P is interpreted as a pension benefit, then τ_ω is the payroll tax that finances a PAYG system.

[27] Assuming that markets are incomplete, *i.e.* commitment devices for hyperbolic are not available, may appear too strong. However, assuming the completeness of financial markets implies also that we should consider that, together with commitment devices, the market would propose "counter-commitment devices" that exploit the consumers' present bias. For instance in the U.S., the growth of IRA accounts, 401*(k)* plans has been followed by the boom of revolving credit cards. Moreover, as we show in the introduction, there is no sure evidence that the introduction of IRA accounts and 401*(k)* plans has effectively boosted individual savings.

[28] Clearly, $\rho^R + \rho^P = 1$ and $\lambda^{TC} + \lambda^{TI} = 1$. Moreover, we assume that the fractions of rich, poor, time consistent and time inconsistent individuals remain the same across periods. Finally, we do not impose any ranking between λ^{TC} and λ^{TI}.

in our economy (see Figure 5 for a graphical representation):

$$y^P_{TI}, y^P_{TC}, y^R_{TI}, y^R_{TC}, o^P_{TI}, o^P_{TC}, o^R_{TI}, o^R_{TC}, ma^P_{TI}, ma^P_{TC}, ma^R_{TI}, ma^R_{TC}$$



Figure 5: Behavioral and Economic Types

The preferences of an old individual of type $i = R, P$ and $j = TI, TC$ depend only on total consumption:

$$U(c_o) = u(c_o^{i,j}) \tag{2}$$

where:

$$c_o^{i,j} = (1 + r(1 - \tau_K)s_{ma}^{i,j}) + P$$

and $s_{ma}^{i,j}$ is the amount of saving accumulated when the individual was middle aged. The pro-capita amount transfer P is:

$$P = \frac{1}{n^o}\left\{\tau_\omega[\omega^R L^P + \omega^P L^R] + \tau_K r\left[\lambda^{TI} S_{TI} + \lambda^{TC} S_{TC}\right]\right\} \tag{3}$$

where $L^i = \rho^i\left(n^y l_y^i + n^{ma} l_{ma}^i\right)$ is the total labor supplied by young and middle aged belonging to the same income group. $S_{TI} = \sum_{i=R,P} \rho^i\left(n^y s_y^{TI,i} + n^{ma} s_{ma}^{TI,i}\right)$ and $S_{TC} = \sum_{i=R,P}\left(n^y s_y^{TC,i} + n^{ma} s_{ma}^{TC,i}\right)$ represent the total amount of saving for time inconsistent and exponential individuals.

The preferences of a *middle aged* depend on consumption, $c_{ma}^{i,j}$, and labor supply, l_{ma}^i:

$$U(c_{ma}, l_{ma}) = u\left(c_{ma}^{i,j}\right) - v(l_{ma}^i) + \beta^j \delta u\left(c_o^{i,j}\right) \tag{4}$$

with:

$$\begin{aligned} c_{ma}^{i,j} &= \omega_i l_{ma}^i(1 - \tau_\omega) + (1 + r(1 - \tau_K))s_y^{i,j} - s_{ma}^{i,j} \\ c_o^{i,j} &= (1 + r(1 - \tau_K)s_{ma}^{i,j}) + P \end{aligned}$$

Finally, the intertemporal utility function for the representative *young* is:

$$U(c_y, l_y) = u\left(c_y^{i,j}\right) - v(l_y^i) + \beta^j \delta\left[u\left(c_{ma}^{i,j}\right) - v(l_{ma}^i) + \delta u\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)\right] \tag{5}$$

where the budget constraints are:

$$\begin{aligned} c_y^{i,j} &= \omega_i l_y^i (1-\tau_\omega) - s_y^{i,j} \\ c_{ma}^{i,j} &= \omega_i l_{ma}^i (1-\tau_\omega) + (1+r(1-\tau_K)) s_y^{i,j} - s_{ma}^{i,j} \\ c_o^{i,j} &= (1+r(1-\tau_K)) s_{ma}^{i,j} + P \end{aligned}$$

The structure of the utility functions (4) and (5) reflect the general hyperbolic utility function (1): the discount structure implies that individuals, when young, discount the utility level of subsequent periods at the rate $\beta\delta$ (middle aged) and $\beta\delta^2$ (old) meaning that they are impatient when they make short run trade-offs. On the other hand, from the point of of view of a young individual, the discount factor between two periods far in the future (between middle age and old age) is simply δ, implying that the agent is patient when he does long run trade offs. To simplify our computations and to obtain closed-form solutions, we assume that $u(.)$ and $v(.)$ (utility from consumption and disutility from labor supply) take two specific functional forms:

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \text{ and } v(l) = \frac{l^\gamma}{\gamma} \tag{6}$$

The utility function belongs to the family of constant utility of substitution, where the elasticity of substitution is given by $\varepsilon = \frac{1}{\sigma}$, with $0 < \sigma \leq 1$[29]. The parameter γ measures the intensity of the disutility of effort.

Let us now move to the political side of our economy. The public policy vector is defined as $q = (\tau_K, \tau_\omega)$: the two parties propose a platform that includes a capital income and a labor income tax. The policy vector is multidimensional, and generally in such a framework an equilibrium may not exists: we adopt a model with probabilistic voting, in the spirit of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Coughlin and Nitzan (1981), which is particularly appropriate in our case since it allows us to consider the ideological bias of the different social classes. We assume that there are two parties, A and B: before the election takes place, each party commits to a platform, q^A and q^B. They act simultaneously and they do not cooperate, and the platform is chosen as to maximize the expected number of voters of the party. Politicians can commit to policies promised during the campaign. This is a classical assumption in the literature. Once the political party has implemented his platform, economic decions are taken. In the spirit of the literature, we also assume that voters are not only interested in the proposed policies, but also in the ideological elements that each party has. To be precise, voters are heterogeneous in terms of ideological preference: voter k in group $x = y_{TI}^P, y_{TC}^P, y_{TI}^R, y_{TC}^R, , ma_{TI}^P, ma_{TC}^P, ma_{TI}^R, ma_{TC}^R, o_{TI}^P, o_{TC}^P, o_{TI}^R, o_{TC}^R$ vote for party A if:

$$V^x(q^A) + \psi + \sigma^{k,x} > V^x(q^B)$$

[29] In particular, for $\sigma = 1$, we have the logarithmic utility function ($\varepsilon = 1$), while $0 < \sigma < 1$ yields $\varepsilon > 1$ (substitutes) and $\sigma < 1$ yields $\varepsilon < 0$ (complements).

where $V^x(q^A)$ is the indirect utility function of voters in group x if policy q^A is implemented and the term $(\psi + \sigma^{k,x})$ reflects voter's k ideological bias towards A. The component ψ is common to all voters and it is uniformly distributed on $\left[-\frac{1}{2d}, \frac{1}{2d}\right]$ with mean zero and density d, whereas $\sigma^{k,x}$ is idiosyncratic and represents the individual ideology of voter k in group x. We assume that this parameter has group-specific uniform distributions over the interval $\left[-\frac{1}{2\phi^x}, \frac{1}{2\phi^x}\right]$, with zero mean and density ϕ^x. Some clarifications are needed: we assume that individual ideology differs among the groups belonging to the same generation; this assumption will be helpful for our political game: time inconsistent individuals are more homogeneous ("single-minded"), in the sense that they care more about the level of labor income taxation.

Each group of individuals has neutral voters (also called swing voters) who are indifferent between A and B. The identity of the swing voters is crucial when a politician consider deviations form the common policy announcement $q_A = q_B$. To better understand this concept, consider only two groups, capitalist (who hold only capital) and workers (who have only labor). Suppose that party A decides to decrease τ_K with a corresponding increase in τ_ω such that the transfer P remains the same. Doing that, the party gains votes from the capitalist equal to the number of swing voters and lose votes from the group of workers equal to the number of swing voters. If the number of swing voters in the first group is greater than the number of swing voters in the second group, the party will have a net gain of votes. Therefore, each party is interested in attracting the more mobile voters in each group. A swing voter in group: x is formally defined by σ^{sv} where:

$$\sigma^{sv} = V^x(q^B) - V^x(q^A) - \psi$$

All voters with $\sigma^{k,x} > \sigma^{sv}$ vote for A and voters with $\sigma^{k,x} < \sigma^{sv}$ vote for B. Therefore, the share of voters in group x that votes for party A is:

$$\pi^{A,x} = \phi^x \left(V^x(q^A) - V^x(q^B) + \psi\right) + \frac{1}{2} \tag{7}$$

The timing of the elections is as follows: (1) The two parties announce their policy platforms; at this stage, economic decisions are already made: therefore, parties knows voters' policy preferences and the distribution of the random variables ψ and $\sigma^{k,x}$, but not their realizations. (2) The value of δ is realized and know. (3) Election takes place and the winning party implements his preferred policy.

Given the definition of the vote share (7), each party maximizes the following objective function:

$$\max_{\{q^A\}} \sum_x v^x \phi^x (V^x(q^A) - V^x(q^B) \tag{8}$$

where v^x represents the number of *voters* in each group x listed above. The central point of our paper is that the number of people who actually show up the election day is lower from the number of person alive in each generation. In subsection 5.2 this point will be made clearer. If the number of swing voters in

every group x is the same, the problem (8) reduces to a simple maximization of average utilities. However, in our framework, groups differ in how votes can be swayed from one party to the other one. Therefore, parties try to please the more mobile voters by giving them more weight in the objective function.

6 Individuals' Problem

6.1 First Step: Labor Supply and Saving

First, let us consider the problem for a young individual with income level ω_i, for $i = R, P$. He chooses labor supply and saving for post-retirement consumption as to maximize the following intertemporal utility function, where the superscript j distinguishes between time consistent and time inconsistent individuals:

$$\max_{l_y^i, c_y^{i,j}} \; u(c,l) = \frac{\left(c_y^{i,j}\right)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} - \frac{\left(l_y^i\right)^{\gamma}}{\gamma} + \beta^j \delta \left(\frac{\left(c_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} - \frac{\left(l_{ma}^i\right)^{\gamma}}{\gamma} + \delta \frac{\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} \right)$$

subject to:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &< l_y^i < 1 \\ c_y^{i,j} + s_y^{i,j} &= \omega_i l_y^i (1-\tau_\omega) \\ c_{ma}^{i,j} + s_{ma}^{i,j} &= \omega_i l_{ma}^i (1-\tau_\omega) + s_y^{i,j}(1 + r(1-\tau_K) \\ c_o^{i,j} &= (1 + r(1-\tau_K) s_{ma}^{i,j}) + P \end{aligned}$$

Replacing the budget constraints into the objective function, the maximization problem becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{l_y^i, c_y^{i,j}} u(c,l) \quad = \quad & \frac{\left(\omega_i l_y^i (1-\tau_\omega) - s_y^{i,j}\right)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} - \frac{\left(l_y^i\right)^{\gamma}}{\gamma} + \\ & \beta^j \delta \left[\frac{\left(\omega_i l_{ma}^i (1-\tau_\omega) - s_y^{i,j}(1 + r(1-\tau_K) - s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} - \frac{\left(l_{ma}^i\right)^{\gamma}}{\gamma} + \delta \left(\frac{\left((1+r(1-\tau_K)) s_{ma}^{i,j} + P\right)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} \right) \right] \end{aligned}$$

subject to:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &< s_y^{i,j} < \omega_i l_y^i (1-\tau_\omega) \\ 0 &< l_y^i < 1 \end{aligned}$$

The FOCs of the problem are:

$$\begin{aligned} FOC\left\{s^y\right\} \quad &: \quad \left(\omega_i (1-\tau_\omega) l_y^i - s_y^{i,j}\right)^{-\rho} = \\ & \quad \beta^j \delta \left(\omega_i (1-\tau_\omega) l_{ma}^i + s_{ma}^{i,j}(1 + r(1-\tau_K)\right)^{-\rho} (1 + r(1-\tau_K) \\ FOC\left\{l_y^i\right\} \quad &: \quad \left[\omega_i (1-\tau_\omega)\right]^{1-\rho} \left(l_y^i\right)^{-\rho} - \left(l_y^i\right)^{\gamma-1} = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Optimal choices for thus given, respectively, by:

$$l_y^*(\omega_i) = (\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega))^\alpha \tag{9}$$

$$\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^* = s(\beta^j, \omega_i, \tau_\omega, \tau_K) \tag{10}$$

where $\alpha = \frac{1-\rho}{\gamma+\rho-1} < 1$ and $\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^* = s(\beta^j, \omega_i, \tau_\omega, \tau_K)$ is a function (whose closed form expression is given in the appendix) that describes optimal individual saving as a function of the parameters of our economy. The following proposition summarizes the properties of this function.

Proposition 1 *The saving function $\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*$ has the following properties, for $i = P, R$ and $j = TI, TC$:*
(i) For given j, $\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*$ is increasing with the productivity level ω_i;
(ii) $\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*$ is decreasing with τ_ω; moreover, $\frac{\partial^2 s_y^{i,j}}{\partial\tau_\omega \partial\omega_i} < 0$;
(iii) Depending on whether the substitution effect or income effect prevails, we have $\frac{\partial\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\tau_K} > 0$ or < 0;
(iv) If the income effect prevails, then $\frac{\partial^2\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\tau_K\partial\omega_i} < 0$; otherwise, $\frac{\partial^2\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\tau_K\partial\omega_i} > 0$;
(v) For given i, $\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*$ is increasing with the parameter of time inconsistency β^j: $\frac{\partial\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\beta^j} > 0$;
(vi) $\frac{\partial^2\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\tau_\omega\partial\beta^j} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\tau_K\partial\beta^j} > 0$.

Proof. In appendix. ■

The first three results of the Proposition are intuitive: in part *(i)* we show that, for a given level of time inconsistency, rich save more than poor: $s_y^{P,j} < s_y^{R,j}$: this result is consistent with the evidence that rich individuals hold the majority of capital of the economy.

In *(ii)*, we state that saving are a decreasing function of τ_ω, the labor income tax. More interestingly, this reduction is negatively correlated with productivity: if the labor income tax rate rises, poor reduce savings more than rich, *for a given level of time inconsistency.*

Result *(iii)* is in line with the theoretical literature on taxation and saving (Bernheim, 1999). More precisely, depending on whether the uncompensated interest elasticity of saving is positive or negative, saving can either decrease or increase in response to a rise of the capital tax rate (*i.e.* an increase in the after-tax rate of return of saving). From one hand, a reduction of τ_K reduces the price of consumption in periods 1 and 2: the associated *substitution effect* shifts consumption towards the future (*i.e.* saving *increase*), if future consumption is a normal good (as we assume). From the other hand, the income effect increases consumption in both periods (*i.e.* saving *decrease*). Unless we specify further the parameters of our model, we are not able to determine which effect prevails in our model. In the rest of the paper, we are going to consider separately the two cases.

Furthermore, we show that rich and poor respond differently after an increase of τ_K (part *iv*): if the income effect prevails (saving *increases*), rich individuals will increase saving more than a poor

individual with the same β^j. On the other hand, if the substitution effect prevails (saving *decreases*), then the derivative is positive: rich individuals decreases less their saving than poor.

In part *(v)*, we have demonstrate that, for a given income level, time inconsistency leads to overconsumption when young: $s_y^{i,TC} > s_y^{i,TI}$, for $i = P, R$. This is a classical results in the behavioral literature, and it is in line with the experimental evidence on the consumption/saving trade-off, and the drop in post retirement consumption experienced by retirees. Moreover, combining this result with part (i), it is possible to show that, if there is enough inequality in the economy, *i.e.* $\omega_R >> \omega_P$, we have that $s_y^{P,TC} < s_y^{R,TI}$. Despite their time inconsistency, hyperbolic rich individuals continue to save more than poor and time consistent agents. Following Laibson (1997), it is possible to prove the following Corollary.

Corollary 1 *Increasing saving from $s_y^{i,TC}$ to $s_y^{i,TI}$ is welfare-improving for time inconsistent individuals (young and middle aged)*

Proof. In appendix. ■

The corollary shows that time inconsistent individuals would benefit from an increase of saving from $s_y^{i,TI}$ up to $s_y^{i,TC}$: if a commitment device that forces them to save up to this level would be made available, total welfare would increase. However, our assumption about the absence of such devices makes this Pareto improvement impossible.

In *(vi)* we focus on the effects of time inconsistency on saving choice, keeping constant the income level: we first show that the decrease of saving due to a higher τ_ω is more intense for hyperbolic consumer; the result is intuitive but meaningful: increasing τ_ω reduces individuals' disposable income and saving (part *(iii)* of the proposition); time inconsistent individuals, who are more likely to sacrifice future consumption in favor of present consumption, reduce more saving that exponential individuals. In the second part of *(vi)* we show an interesting result: following a marginal variation of τ_K, exponential are more responsive than time inconsistent in adapting saving; more precisely, if the income effect prevails (saving increase), exponential will increase saving more than hyperbolic. If the substitution effect dominates, the decrease in saving accumulation will be higher for exponential individuals. The intuition for the result is the following: for a hyperbolic young, the effects of a change in the tax are postponed in the future, given that they attach less weight to future utility, and therefore they are less responsive in adapting their saving to the changes in the tax code. If τ_K increases, and the income effect dominates, it means the price of future consumption is lower: however, time inconsistent individuals attach a lower weight to this price reduction. If the substitution effect dominates, *i.e.* saving decrease, exponential marginally reduce saving more than hyperbolic: the negative effect of higher future tax (reduction of the after tax return of saving) is not fully internalized by a time inconsistent individual, who will react by reducing less its saving now. When we compute the equilibrium policy vector, we will show that these points are crucial for the equilibrium.

Let us now consider the problem of a middle aged individual of type $i = R, P$ and $j = TI, TC$:

$$\max_{l^i_{ma}, c^{i,j}_{ma}} u(c,l) = \frac{\left(c^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} - \frac{\left(l^i_{ma}\right)^{\gamma}}{\gamma} + \beta^j \delta \frac{\left(c^{i,j}_{o}\right)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho}$$

subject to:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &< l^i_{ma} < 1 \\ c^{i.j}_{ma} + s^{i,j}_{ma} &= \omega_i l^i_{ma}(1-\tau_\omega) + s^{i,j}_y (1 + r(1-\tau_K)) \\ c^{i.j}_o &= (1 + r(1-\tau_K) s^{i,j}_{ma}) + P \end{aligned}$$

Replacing the budget constraint into the objective function, we get:

$$\max_{l_{ma}, s^{i,j}_{ma}} u(c_{ma}, l_{ma}) = \frac{(\omega_i l^i_{ma}(1-\tau_\omega) + s^{i,j}_y (1 + r(1-\tau_K) - s^{i,j}_{ma})^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} - \frac{\left(l^i_{ma}\right)^{\gamma}}{\gamma} + \beta^j \delta \left(\frac{((1+r(1-\tau_K)) s^{i,j}_{ma} + P)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} \right)$$

subject to:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &< s^{i,j}_{ma} < \omega_i l^i_{ma}(1-\tau_\omega) \\ 0 &< l^i_{ma} < 1 \end{aligned}$$

for given $\omega_i, \tau_\omega, \tau_K$. It is easy to see that the first order conditions are:

$$\begin{aligned} FOC\left\{s^{i,j}_{ma}\right\} &: \left(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega) l^i_{ma} + s^{i,j}_y (1 + r(1-\tau_K) - s^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^{-\rho} = \\ & \quad \beta^j \delta \left(s^{i,j}_{ma}(1 + r(1-\tau_K) + P\right)^{-\rho} (1 + r(1-\tau_K) \\ FOC\left\{l^i_{ma}\right\} &: \left[\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)\right]^{1-\rho} \left(l^i_{ma}\right)^{-\rho} - \left(l^i_{ma}\right)^{\gamma-1} = 0 \end{aligned}$$

and the optimal levels of saving and labor supply are given by:

$$\left(s^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^* = s(\beta^j, \omega_i, \tau_\omega, \tau_K) \tag{11}$$

$$l^*_{ma}(\omega_i) = (\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega))^{\alpha} \tag{12}$$

From equations (11) and (12), it is easy to see that labor supply does not depend on β^j, while the consumption saving trade-off is influenced by hyperbolic discounting. More precisely, performing some comparative statics over the function $s(.)$, we are able to prove the following proposition:

Proposition 2 *The saving function $\left(s^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^*$ has the following properties, for $i = P, R$ and $j = TI, TC$:*
(i) For given j, $\left(s^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^*$ is increasing with income;
(ii) $\left(s^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^*$ is decreasing in τ_ω; moreover, $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i} < 0$;
(iii) Depending on whether the substitution effect or income effect prevails, we have $\frac{\partial \left(s^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K} > 0$ or < 0;
(iv) If the income effect prevails, then $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i} < 0$; otherwise, $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s^{i,j}_{ma}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i} > 0$;

(v) For given i, two effects determines the sign of $\frac{\partial\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\beta^j}$: if the exponential effect dominates the catching up effect, we have $\frac{\partial\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\beta^j} > 0$; otherwise, $\frac{\partial\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\beta^j} < 0$;
(vi) $\frac{\partial^2\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\tau_\omega\partial\beta^j} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial\tau_K\partial\beta^j} > 0$.

Proof. In appendix. ■

Corollary 2 *Increasing saving from $s_{ma}^{i,TC}$ to $s_{ma}^{i,TI}$ is welfare-improving for time inconsistent individuals (young and middle aged)*

Proof. In appendix. ■

Intuitions behind Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 are similar to those of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. The only exception is given by part *iv*: now, it may be possible that an hyperbolic middle aged saves *more* than a time inconsistent one. The two opposite effects that determine the sign of the derivative are the expontial effect and the exponential effect (that increases saving for hyperbolic). The intuition for the existence of this two effects is the following: depending on the degree of time inconsistency, *i.e.* the value of β_j, two forces determine how time inconsistency affect saving: from one hand, the bias toward the present leads to overconsumption today (the *exponential* effect). On the other hand, since we assume that hyperbolic are aware of their time inconsistency (we rule out the existence of *naive* individuals), it is also possible that, to finance consumption when old, they decide to save more, compared to an exponential individual. The condition that determines whether the the exponential effect dominates the catching up effect is given in the appendix.

The problem for old individual is very simple: they do not make any economic choice and only consume their accumulated saving and the transfer $P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K)$.

Once we know optimal saving and the labor choices for young and middle aged, we can determine the equilibrium pension transfer $P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K)$ received by old (see the Appendix for the closed form expression for $P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K)$). In the following, to keep notation simple, we denote with $l_y^*(\omega_i)$ and $l_{ma}^*(\omega_i)$ the optimal labor supplies for, respectively, young and middle aged, and with $s_y^*(\beta^j, \omega_i)$ and $s_{ma}^*(\beta^j, \omega_i)$ their optimal saving decisions, for income levels $i = R, P$ and the individuals' degree of time inconsistency $j = TI, TC$, such that $\beta^{TI} = \beta < 1$ and $\beta^{TC} = 1$.

The transfer P satisfies the following properties

Proposition 3 *The equilibrium transfer $P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K)$ is:*

(i) Increasing in the level of the labor income tax up to $\tilde{\tau}_\omega$ and then decreasing;

(iia) If the substitution effect prevails, the pension function is increasing with the level of the capital income tax up to $\tilde{\tau}_K$ and then decreasing;

(iib) If the income effect prevails, the pension function is increasing and convex in τ_K.



Figure 6: The Pension Function

Proof. In appendix. ■

In Proposition 3 we first show that $P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K)$ is concave both in the labor income and in capital income tax rates (if saving decrease with τ_K), with maxima, respectively, at $\tilde{\tau}_\omega$ and $\tilde{\tau}_K$. However, when the income effect prevails, saving increases with the tax rate: it follows that the pension function is convex, with a maximum at $\tau_K = 1$ (see Figure 6). In the following, to make the analysis non-trivial[30], we will restrict our attention to the interval $\tau_\omega \in [0, \tilde{\tau}_\omega]$.

For future references, we can compute the indirect utility functions for every type alive in the economy: poor, rich, time consistent and time inconsistent.

$$\begin{aligned} V_y^{i,j} &= \frac{\left[\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)l_y^*(\omega_i) - s_y^*(\beta^j,\omega_i)\right]^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{\left(l_y^*(\omega_i)\right)^\gamma}{\gamma} \\ &+\beta^j\delta\left[\frac{\left[\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)l_y^*(\omega_i) - s_{ma}^*(\beta^j,\omega_i) + (1+r(1-\tau_K))s_y^*(\beta^j,\omega_i)\right]^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{(l_{ma}^*(\omega_i))^\gamma}{\gamma}\right] \\ &+\beta^j\delta^2\frac{\left[s_{ma}^*(\beta^j,\omega_i)(1+r(1-\tau_K)) + P\right]^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

$$\begin{aligned} V_{ma}^{i,j} &= \frac{\left[\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)l_y^*(\omega_i) - s_y^*(\beta^j,\omega_i)\right]^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{\left(l_y^*(\omega_i)\right)^\gamma}{\gamma} \\ &+\beta^j\delta\left[\frac{\left[\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)l_y^*(\omega_i) - s_{ma}^*(\beta^j,\omega_i) + (1+r(1-\tau_K))s_y^*(\beta^j,\omega_i)\right]^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{(l_{ma}^*(\omega_i))^\gamma}{\gamma}\right] \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

$$V_o^{i,j} = \frac{\left[(1+r(1-\tau_K))s_{ma}^*(\beta^j,\omega_i) + P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)\right]^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \tag{15}$$

[30] If the tax rate is above $\tilde{\tau}_\omega$, it is obvious that every individual prefers to tax more capital, since it increases the transfer P_{eq}.

6.2 Second step: To Vote or Not to Vote?

The evidence presented in Section 4 has demonstrated that it exists a positive correlation between productivity level and political participation (voting turnout, campaign contributions. lobbying etc.). With our model, we do not want to explain the determinants of this correlation, but we take it as granted, and we study how the implications of classical political economy model change.

To be precise, we assume that there exist an exogenous costs C associated with voting activity (watching debates on TV, comparing different political platforms and candidates etc.). If these costs are high enough, an individual chooses not to vote. We realize that this is a very simplifying assumption: a more realistic and complicated model should take into account that the voting decision results from as a trade-off between two opposite forces: from one hand, voting is costly and poor may decide not to vote; on the other hand, there are psychological factors, not related to any economic variable, that positively affect the probability of voting: for instance, some individuals perceive voting activity as a "duty", and thus they to do it anyway, whatever the cost is. The psychological motive could be modeled as an *i.i.d.* random variable R, with c.d.f. $F(.)$ and density $f(.)$. In this modified framework, very poor individuals with high psychological motivation may still decide to vote in equilibrium. We believe, however, that all main insights of our simplified model will hold also in such enlarged framework since for poor individuals the first force is still relevant, whereas for rich individuals the cost C remains negligible.

In our model, to take into account that we do not observe zero turnout among poorer citizens, we assume that, within each generation, only a fraction z of them votes [31], while all rich individuals vote: the budget constraints of the z poor and all rich voters are modified as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} c_y^{i,j} + s_y^{i,j} &= \omega_i l_y^i (1-\tau_\omega) - C \\ c_{ma}^{i,j} + s_{ma}^{i,j} &= \omega_i l_{ma}^i (1-\tau_\omega) + s_y^{i,j}(1 + r(1-\tau_K) - C \\ c_o^{i,j} &= (1 + r(1-\tau_K))(s_y^{i,j} + s_{ma}^{i,j}) + P - C \end{aligned}$$

Notice that, due to the fact that C is fixed, the comparative statics we have performed in the previous section remains valid. Our assumption of lower turnout among poor create a discrepancy between the number of *voters* and the number of individuals *currently alive*; in particular, the number of voters for every group x, denoted by v^x, is given by:

[31] Empirical evidence shows that there is a correlation between age and political participation: senior citizens more involved in the political process: however, for the moment, we neglect this additional stylized fact.

$v_y^{P,TI} = z\rho^P\lambda^{TI}n^y$	Poor hyperbolic Y	$v_y^{P,TC} = z\rho^P\lambda^{TC}n^y$	Poor exponential Y
$v_y^{R,TI} = \rho^R\lambda^{TI}n^y$	Rich hyperbolic Y	$v_y^{R,TC} = \rho^R\lambda^{TC}n^y$	Rich exponential Y
$v_{ma}^{P,TI} = z\rho^P\lambda^{TI}n^{ma}$	Poor hyperbolic MA	$v_{ma}^{P,TC} = z\rho^P\lambda^{TC}n^{ma}$	Poor exponential MA
$v_{ma}^{R,TI} = \rho^R\lambda^{TI}n^{ma}$	Rich hyperbolic MA	$v_{ma}^{R,TC} = \rho^R\lambda^{TC}n^{ma}$	Rich exponential MA
$v_o^{P,TI} = z\rho^P\lambda^{TI}n^o$	Poor hyperbolic O	$v_o^{P,TC} = z\rho^P\lambda^{TC}n^o$	Poor exponential O
$v_o^{R,TI} = \rho^R\lambda^{TI}n^o$	Rich hyperbolic O	$v_o^{R,TC} = \rho^R\lambda^{TC}n^o$	Rich exponential O

The parameter z is chosen such that the number of rich individuals do not represent the majority of the electorate (the vote share of rich middle aged plus rich young plus rich old is lower than 1/2 of the total population), so that the policy proposed in equilibrium must also receive the approval of the poor classes, in every generation.

7 The Party's Choices: Solving the Model

Each party maximizes the expected total number of votes from the three generations currently alive, taking into account all the subgroups that exist within each generation, and the different turnouts level among rich and poor. Formally,

$$\max_{\{q^A\}} \sum_x v^x \phi^x (V^x(q^A) - V^x(q^B) \tag{16}$$

where $V_y^{i,j}(q^m), V_{ma}^{i,j}(q^m), V_o^{i,j}(q^m)$ are defined above in, respectively, equations (13), (14) and (15)

The equilibrium concept we adopt is the same adopted in Profeta (2004): the two parties decide the policy vector having in mind the utility of current generations . Young and middle aged expect, in a stationary equilibrium, the policies to be the same in future. Maximization of problem (16) gives us the two following FOCs:

$$\begin{aligned} FOC\{\tau_\omega\} \quad &: \quad \sum_x v^x \phi^x \frac{dV^x}{d\tau_\omega} = 0 \\ FOC\{\tau_K\} \quad &: \quad \sum_x v^x \phi^x \frac{dV^x}{d\tau_K} = 0 \end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

8 Equilibrium

8.1 Labor Income Tax Rates

Before considering in detail the two FOCs, let us consider the properties of preferred tax rates for the different groups in our economy.

Proposition 4 *Preferred labor tax rates have the following properties:*

(i) For a given level of time inconsistency, preferred labor tax rates are decreasing with income: $\tau_\omega^y(\omega_P, \beta^j) > \tau_\omega^y(\omega_R, \beta^j)$ *and* $\tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P, \beta^j) > \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R, \beta^j)$*;*

(ii) Every old individual set $\tau_\omega^o(\omega_i, \beta^j) = \tilde{\tau}_\omega$, $\forall i, j$;

(iii) For a given income level, hyperbolic consumers prefer lower labor income taxes than time consistent ones: $\tau_\omega^y(\omega_i, \beta^{TC} = 1) > \tau_\omega^y(\omega_i, \beta^{TI})$ *and* $\tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_i, \beta^{TC} = 1) > \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_i, \beta^{TI})$;

(iv) If there is enough inequality in the economy, we have that, for young individual: $\tau_\omega^y(\omega_R, \beta^{TC} = 1) > \tau_\omega^y(\omega_R, \beta^{TI}) > \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P, \beta^{TC} = 1) > \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P, \beta^{TI})$;

(v) If there is enough inequality in the economy, we have that, for middle aged individual: $\tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R, \beta^{TC} = 1) > \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R, \beta^{TI}) > \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P, \beta^{TC} = 1) > \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P, \beta^{TI})$.

Proof. In appendix. ■

This proposition sheds light on voting behavior of our different groups: in *(i)*, we show the intuitive result that preferred τ_ω are decreasing with income: poor individuals look for more intergenerational redistribution, and prefer to increase the tax as to increase the transfer P.

In *(ii)*, we show that all old individuals (rich, poor, time consistent and time inconsistent) set the same level of the labor tax: since all the economic decisions have been already taken, they maximize consumption by setting the tax rate that maximize the pension function, $\tilde{\tau}_\omega$.

In *(iii)*, we analyse the second source of heterogeneity, keeping the productivity level constant. We show that hyperbolic individuals set lower tax rates than exponential: the intuition is that the former group has a different trade-off for labor taxation than the latter: for hyperbolic, increasing τ_ω has a cost now (it reduces current labor supply and consumption), and a benefit postponed in the future (it increases the transfer P when old), that is discounted by the factor $\beta^2\delta$. On the other hand, exponential, who fully understand the intertemporal trade-off at stake, set the "right"tax rate.

Finally, in *(iv)* and *(v)* we aggregate for the two sources of heterogeneity and we rank preferred labor tax rates as follows:

$$\tau_\omega^o(\omega_i, \beta^j) = \tilde{\tau}_\omega > \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P, \beta^{TC}) > \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P, \beta^{TI}) > \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P, \beta^{TC}) > \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P, \beta^{TI})$$
$$> \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R, \beta^{TC}) > \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R, \beta^{TI}) > \tau_\omega^y(\omega_R, \beta^{TC}) > \tau_\omega^y(\omega_R, \beta^{TI}) \tag{18}$$

8.2 Capital Income Tax Rates

Depending on whether the substitution or the income effect prevails, two different cases are possible.

8.2.1 Case (a): The Income Effect is Lower than the Substitution Effect

If increasing τ_K reduces saving, we have that the pension funcion is increasing and concave in τ_K (see figure 6). The following proposition follows immediately.

Proposition 5 (Substituion Effect Dominates) *Preferred tax rates, denoted $\tau_K^g(\beta^j, \omega_i)$, for $g = y, ma, o$; $i = R, P$ and $j = TI, TC$, satisfy the following properties:*

(i) $\tau_K^g(\beta^j, \omega_i)$ are decreasing with income, $\forall g$, for a given j;

(ii) $\tau_K^g(\beta^j, \omega_i)$ are decreasing with the parameter of time inconsistency β^j, $\forall g$, and for a given i;

(iii) For given i and j, we have: $\tau_K^o(\beta^j, \omega_i) > \tau_K^y(\beta^j, \omega_i) = \tau_K^{ma}(\beta^j, \omega_i)$.

(iv) If there is enough inequality in the economy, we have that, for given g:

$$\tau_K^g(\omega_R, \beta^{TC} = 1) < \tau_K^g(\omega_R, \beta^{TI}) < \tau_K^g(\omega_P, \beta^{TC} = 1) < \tau_K^g(\omega_P, \beta^{TI}).$$

Proof. In appendix. ■

In part *(i)* we show that preferred capital taxes are decreasing with income: first, poor individuals save less, and a higher tax on capital reduces less consumption levels and utiltity. Second, poor individuals want to benefit from redistribution, and increasing τ_K increases also P.

In *(ii)*, we keep constant the productivity level, and we analyze how time consistent and hyperbolic set capital tax rates. The fact that, within all generations, we have $\tau_\omega(\omega_i, 1) < \tau_\omega(\omega_i, \beta^{TI})$, come from two effects. First, time inconsistent individuals save less than exponential, and therefore a higher tax reduces less the after tax return of saving. Moreover, we have seen in Propositions 1*(v)* and 2*(v)*, that the decrease in saving due to a higher τ_K is lower for time inconsistent agents. Therefore, the decrease in current and future utility is lower for this group. The second effect comes from the fact that taxing capital lead to an intertemporal trade-off not present in labor taxation. Taxing more capital income increases consumption now (which is beneficial, from the perspective of a present biased individual) and delayed costs (less consumption tomorrow, due to less saving and lower net capital income). Both effects goes in the same direction, namely hyperbolic would like to set higher capital taxes than exponential, in order to keep constant P^{eq}.[32]

Part *(iii)* shows that, for the same β^j and ω_i, old prefer higher taxes than young and middle aged. Like for labor taxes, old do not make any economic decision: the tax rate they set maximizes consumption. Notice that this tax is lower than $\tilde{\tau}_K$, the tax that maximizes P^{eq}. This tax is too high, since old individuals have also accumulated saving yielding interest.

An interesting result is that a young individual of type i, j sets the same tax rate as a middle aged.

[32] In Proposition 5 we have assumed that middle aged time inconsistent save less than exponential, *i.e.* the exponential effect dominates the catching up effect. If this is not the case, and hyperbolic saves more the two effects described before goes in opposite directions. A priori, we do not know whether the chain of inequalities (20) changes or not. If yes, we have that: $\tau_K^{ma}(\omega_P, 1) > \tau_K^{ma}(\omega_P, \beta) > \tau_K^{ma}(\omega_R, 1) > \tau_K^{ma}(\omega_R, \beta)$.

Finally, in *(iv)* we aggregate for the two sources of heterogeneity and we rank preferred labor tax rates:

$$\tilde{\tau}_K > \tau_K^o(\omega_P, \beta) > \tau_K^o(\omega_P, 1) > \tau_K^o(\omega_R, \beta) > \tau_K^o(\omega_R, 1) > \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P, \beta) > \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P, 1) > \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R, \beta) > \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R, 1) \tag{19}$$

where $\bar{\tau}_K(\omega_i, \beta^j)$ is the common tax rate for young and middle age agents with the same i and j.

8.2.2 Case (b): The Income Effect Dominates the Substitution Effect

If a higher τ_K boosts saving, we have that the pension funcion is increasing and convex in τ_K (see figure 6). in the following proposition, we summarize our findings, and we compare the resulting tax rates with those of Case (a).

Proposition 6 (Income Effect prevails) *Preferred tax rates, denoted $\hat{\tau}_K^g(\beta^j, \omega_i)$, for $g = y, ma, o$; $i = R, P$ and $j = TI, TC$, satisfy the following properties:*

(i) $\tau_K^g(\beta^j, \omega_i)$ are increasing with income, $\forall g$, for a given j;

(ii) $\tau_K^g(\beta^j, \omega_i)$ are decreasing with the parameter of time inconsistency β^j, $\forall g$, and for a given i;

(iii) For given i and j, we have $\tau_K^o(\beta^j, \omega_i) > \tau_K^y(\beta^j, \omega_i) = \tau_K^{ma}(\beta^j, \omega_i)$.

(iv) If there is enough inequality in the economy, we have that, for given g: $\tau_\omega^g(\omega_R, \beta^{TC} = 1) < \tau_\omega^g(\omega_R, \beta^{TI}) < \tau_\omega^g(\omega_P, \beta^{TC} = 1) < \tau_\omega^g(\omega_P, \beta^{TI})$.

(v) $\forall i, j, g$, we have that: $\hat{\tau}_K^g(\beta^j, \omega_i) > \tau_K^g(\beta^j, \omega_i)$.

Proof. In appendix. ■

The proposition shows that results do not change substantially from Case (a). However, an interesting result is given in part i: now, rich individuals prefer *higher* taxes than poor individual: for them, consumption in the future is cheaper, and a higher tax increases it through saving. Moreover, in part (v), we claim that preferred capital tax rates are always higher if the income effect prevails than when the substitution effect prevails.

8.3 Political Equilibria

Given the structure of voters' preferred tax rates, it is immediate to see why time inconsistent individuals prefer to have a policy vector in which capital taxes are relatively higher than labor income ones. To simplify, in the following we are going to concentrate on Case (a),*i.e* saving decrease in response to an increase in τ_K. The following lemma proves that time inconsistent individuals are more single minded that time consistent ones.

Lemma 1 *Hyperbolic individuals are more ideologically homogeneous (single minded) than time consistent ones.*

If individuals have to decide whether to tax more capital or labor income in order to finance a given intergenerational transfer P, they take into account not owned factors (labor and capital) but also the timing of the tax. Time inconsistent agents prefer a relatively high capital tax with respect to a exponential individual with the same income level because it has less capital than him and the (negative) effect of a higher tax are postponed in the future (if young) and soften by the suboptimality of his choice (if middle aged). This result comes from the assumption that some individuals are time inconsistent: single mindedness is thus endogenously determined (like in Profeta 2005), and not exogenously assumed, as in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2003). Having in mind this important result, we are ready to fully describe the set of political equilibria in our model:

Proposition 7 *In our economy, both parties converge to the same fiscal platform: $q^{eq} = (\tau_\omega^{eq}, \tau_K^{eq})$. The equilibrium platform q^{eq} is characterized as follows:*

(i) if $z = 1$ and $\rho^{TI} = 0$, q^{eq} is such that:

$$\tau_\omega^y(\omega_R) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R) < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P) < \boldsymbol{\tau_\omega^{eq}} < \tilde{\tau}_\omega \tag{20}$$

$$\bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R) < \boldsymbol{\tau_K^{eq}} < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P) < \tau_K^o(\omega_R) < \tilde{\tau}_K$$

(ii) if $z < 1$ and $\rho^{TI} = 0$, q^{eq} is such that:

$$\tau_\omega^y(\omega_R) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R) < \boldsymbol{\tau_\omega^{eq}} < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P) < \tilde{\tau}_\omega \tag{21}$$

$$\boldsymbol{\tau_K^{eq}} < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P) < \tau_K^o(\omega_R) < \tilde{\tau}_K$$

(iii) if $z = 1$ and $\rho^{TI} > 0$, q^{eq} is such that:

$$\begin{aligned} \tau_\omega^y(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_R,1) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R,1) < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P,\beta) < \\ < \boldsymbol{\tau_\omega^{eq}} < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P,1) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P,\beta) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P,1) \quad < \quad \tilde{\tau}_\omega \end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R,1) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R,\beta) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P,1) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P,\beta) < \\ < \boldsymbol{\tau_K^{eq}} < \tau_K^o(\omega_R,1) < \tau_K^o(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P,1) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P,\beta) < \tilde{\tau}_K \end{aligned}$$

(iv) if $z < 1$ and $\rho^{TI} > 0$, q^{eq} is such that:

$$\tau_\omega^y(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_R,1) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R,1) < \boldsymbol{\tau_\omega^{eq}} < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P,\beta) < \\ < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P,1) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P,\beta) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P,1) < \tilde{\tau}_\omega \tag{23}$$

$$\bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R,1) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R,\beta) < \boldsymbol{\tau_K^{eq}} < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P,1) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P,\beta) < \\ < \tau_K^o(\omega_R,1) < \tau_K^o(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P,1) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P,\beta) < \tilde{\tau}_K$$

In equilibrium, both parties propose the same platform: the problem (17) they have to solve is the same, thus the policy vectors coincides, $q^A = q^B$ and individuals reach the same utility levels under the two platforms, $V_g^{i,j}(q^A) = V_g^{i,j}(q^B)$, $\forall i, j, g$.

In part (i), we show that, if all poor participates in the political process (full turnout, $z = 1$) and time inconsistency is not an issue ($\rho^{TI} = 0$), the result already shown in Tabellini-Persson (2003) emerges: representing the majority of the electorate, and holding less capital, poor prefer to tax more capital than labor income: both parties will then propose a policy vector that includes poor preferred tax rates, that is high capital and labor taxes. With full turnout, in our economy there only 6 (or 4) groups[33] The coalition made of old and poor individuals is more attractive for both parties.

In part (ii), we show that without time inconsistency, but with turnout correlated to income level, q^{eq}, it is the upper class, who saves more, to be more attractive for the parties, who are proposing low capital and labor income taxes would not ensure victory. No party can offer both low τ_ω and τ_K and a positive transfer P.

In part (iii) we consider the case of full turnout and time inconsistency: the policy platform is distorted toward capital taxation, and the equilibrium capital tax is higher than incase *(i)*: in this case, also time inconsistent individuals prefer to tax more capital than labor income, given that their saving are suboptmal, and they are more mobile than rich, exponential, agents.

Finally, in part (iv), we consider both $z < 1$ and $\rho^{TI} > 0$. The two competing parties, to win the elections, have to please the swing voters: since hyperbolic care more about labor income taxation, they are more "single minded" and more likely to sway their vote if the tax burden is more distorted toward capital taxation. Therefore, proposing hyperbolic's preferred τ_K and τ_ω, both parties recieve the support of hyperbolic rich and the fraction of politically active poor.

9 An Illustration

Without loss of generality, let us suppose that it exists only one generation, and furthermore that the the value of the parameters is such that $s^{P.TI} < s^{P.TC} = s^{R.TI} < s^{TC.R}$. There are $n + 1$ individuals in our

[33] From Propositions 4, 5 and 6, we know that all old behave politically in the same way for capital taxation and young and middle aged prefer the same capital tax.

economy; the n agents are equally split into the four groups (*i.e.* each group has size 1/4) and there is also a "lonely" poor[34], who can be either hyperbolic or exponential. Following the results of Propositions 4 and 5, we have that preferred capital tax rates are such that: $\tau_K^{P.TI} > \tau_K^{P.TC} = \tau_K^{R.TI} > \tau_K^{TC.R}$. With exponential preferences and full turnout, there are only two preferred tax rates: τ_K^P and τ_K^R, with $\tau_K^P > \tau_K^R$. The probabilisting voting equilibrium is such that τ_K^P would be proposed in the equilibrium platform q by both parties.

Next step is to suppose that no poor, except for the lonely one, show up at the election day: than the implemented τ_K will be τ_K^R, but this exaclty the paradoxical result that we do not observe in reality. However, with hyperbolic consumers (and limited turnout), an opportunistic party maximizes the number of votes obtainde by proposing the τ_K preferred by $s_{ma}^{R.TI}$, as to gain $\frac{1}{2} + 1$ of the *effective* electorate.

10 Conclusions

This paper sheds light on the political determination of the tax burden (capital taxation and labor taxation): in particular, we try to justify why we observe positive level of capital taxes, in spite of the popular view and most normative economic theories. Two main ingredients characterize our political economy model: first, we realistically take into account that political participation is an increasing function of income (Lijpart, 1994) and therefore positive levels of capital taxation can not be justified simply by invoking the political power of the lower class. Second, we introduce time inconsistency in individuals' preferences: we are able to show that also the upper class may be in favor of tax burden distorted toward capital taxation. The intuition for our result is fairly simple: we show that time inconsistent individuals are more politically homogeneous ("single-minded") and, for any income level, in order to finance government's expenditures, prefer to tax more capital income, instead of labor income, since the capital they have accumulated is below the planned (and optimal) level. An opportunistic political party that maximizes the probability of winning the elections, therefore, finds profitable to propose a policy vector that entails a positive, and possibly high, level of capital taxation: the group of hyperbolic individuals has more "swing voters", and it is more united in his political action.

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A Appendix

A.1 Closed Form expressions for Saving

In Section 4 we only provided the generic form for the equilibrium saving functions. Replacing $u(c)$ and $v(l)$ with their specific functional forms, we get the following closed-form expressions for $(s_y^{i,j})^*$ and $(s_{ma}^{i,j})^*$, for $i = P, R$ and $j = TI, TC$:

$$\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^* = \frac{(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega))^\alpha \left[1-\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}}\left(1+\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{-1}\right]-\left(\beta^j\delta(1+r(1-\tau_K))\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}P}{\left(1+(\beta^j\delta)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}+\left((\beta^j\delta)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^2\right)} \tag{A24}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^* &= \frac{(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega))^\alpha \left[1-\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}}\left(1+\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{-1}\right]}{\left(1+(\beta^j\delta)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}+\left((\beta^j\delta)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^2\right)} + \\ &-\frac{\left(\beta^j\delta(1+r(1-\tau_K))\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}P}{\left(1+(\beta^j\delta)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}(1+r(1-\tau_K))}\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}\right)}\left(1+\frac{\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\left(1+(\beta^j\delta)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}+\left((\beta^j\delta)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+r(1-\tau_K))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^2\right)}\right)\end{aligned} \tag{A25}$$

where $\beta^j = \{\beta, 1\}$ denotes the short term discount factors, with $1 = \beta^{TC} < \beta < 1$ and $\alpha = \frac{\sigma(\gamma-\sigma)-1}{\sigma(\gamma-1)-1}$.

A.2 Useful Derivatives

The sign of some derivatives will be crucial in the following proofs. First, let us introduce some notation:

$$M = (1 + r(1 - \tau_K)) > 0$$
$$K = \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} > 0$$
$$R = 1 + K + K^2 > 0$$

Expressions (A24) and (A25) can be reduced to:

$$\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^* = \frac{(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega))^\alpha \left[1-\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}} (1+K)^{-1}\right] - \left(\beta^j \delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} P}{R} > 0 \tag{A26}$$

$$\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^* = \frac{(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega))^\alpha \left[R+M\left(1-\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}} (1+K)^{-1}\right)\right]}{R(1+K)} - \frac{\left(\beta^j \delta M\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} P}{(1+K)} \left(1 + \frac{K}{R}\right) > 0 \tag{A27}$$

We are interested in determining how K, R, M vary with the capital income tax rate, τ_K, and the short term discount factor, β^j:

$\frac{\partial M}{\partial \tau_K} = -r < 0;$

$\frac{\partial K}{\partial \tau_K} = \left(\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \left(\beta^j \delta M\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\partial M}{\partial \tau_K}\right) = \left(\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma} \left(\beta^j \delta M\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} r\right) > 0$, since $\sigma \in (0, 1)$

$\frac{\partial R}{\partial \tau_K} = \frac{\partial K}{\partial \tau_K} (1 + 2K) > 0$

$\frac{\partial M}{\partial \beta^j} = 0$

$\frac{\partial K}{\partial \beta^j} = -\left(\frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}-1} M^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right) < 0$

$\frac{\partial R}{\partial \beta^j} = \frac{\partial K}{\partial \beta^j} (1 + 2K) < 0$

For future references, we compute also how β^j influences the marginal variation of saving in response to an increase of τ_K:

$\frac{\partial^2 M}{\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j} = 0$

$\frac{\partial^2 K}{\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j} = -\left(\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma^2} \delta M \left(\beta^j \delta M\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}-1} r\right) < 0$

$\frac{\partial R}{\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j} = \frac{\partial^2 K}{\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j} (1 + 2K) + 2 \frac{\partial K}{\partial \tau_K} \frac{\partial K}{\partial \beta^j} < 0$

A.3 Proof of Proposition 1

Part *(i)* is straightforward: from (A26) it is immediate to see that $\frac{\partial \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \omega_i} > 0$.

For *(ii)*, differentiating (A26) with respect to τ_ω, we obtain:

$$\frac{\partial \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_\omega} = -\alpha \left(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)\right)^{\alpha-1} \frac{\left[1 - \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}} (1+K)^{-1}\right]}{R} < 0$$

Moreover,

$$\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i} = -\alpha\left(\alpha-1\right)\left(\omega_i\left(1-\tau_\omega\right)\right)^{\alpha-2} \frac{\left[1-\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}}\left(1+K\right)^{-1}\right]}{R} > 0$$

In part *(iii)* of the Proposition, we show that two opposite effects determine the marginal variation of (A26) with respect to τ_K:

$$\frac{\partial \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K} = \begin{array}{c} \underbrace{\frac{\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}}{R}\left(\left(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)\right)^\alpha M(1+K)^{-1}\frac{\partial K}{\partial \tau_K}+\frac{P}{R}\frac{\partial R}{\partial \tau_K}\right)}_{\textit{Income Effect (I)}}+ \\ \underbrace{-\frac{r\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}}{\sigma R}\left(\frac{2P}{M}+\left(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)\right)^\alpha\left(1+K\right)^{-1}(2-\sigma)\right)-\frac{1-\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M(1+K)^{-1}}{R}\frac{\partial R}{\partial \tau_K}}_{\textit{Substitution Effect (II)}} \end{array}$$

If $II > I$, (*resp.* $I > II$), saving decrease (*resp.* increase) if τ_K is raised. Only a further specification of the parameters of our model (but with a substantial loss of generality) will determine which effect prevails.

For part (iv), we have that:

$$\frac{\partial \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i} = \frac{\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}}{R}(1-\tau_\omega)^\alpha(1+K)^{-1}\left[M\frac{\partial K}{\partial \tau_K}-\frac{r(2-\sigma)}{\sigma}\right]$$

The term in square brackets determines the sign of the whole derivative: if the income effect outweighs the substitution effect, then the first term is higher than the second, and $\frac{\partial\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i} > 0$; otherwise, $\frac{\partial\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i} < 0$.

In part*(v)*, we show that saving are increasing in the short term discount factor, *i.e. sign* $\frac{\partial\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j} > 0$. To prove that, notice that (A26) can be decomposed into three terms:

$$\begin{array}{ll} (a) & \left(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)\right)^\alpha\left[1-\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}}\left(1+K\right)^{-1}\right] \\ (b) & -\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} P \\ (c) & R \end{array}$$

A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for $\frac{\partial\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta}$ to be positive is that both *(a)* and *(b)* are increasing with β^j, given that we already show that $\frac{\partial R}{\partial \beta^j} < 0$. By differentiating the two terms, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial(a)}{\partial \beta^j} &= \left(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)\right)^\alpha\left[\frac{\delta\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}-1} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}}\left(2+K\right)}{\sigma\left(1+K\right)^2}\right] > 0 \\ \frac{\partial(b)}{\partial \beta^j} &= \frac{2}{\sigma}\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2+\sigma}{\sigma}} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

It follows that $\frac{\partial\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j} > 0$.

In *(vi)*, we first show that increasing the labor income tax lead to a greater reduction in saving for hyperbolic individuals:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \beta^j} = -\alpha \left(\omega_i (1-\tau_\omega)\right)^{\alpha-1} sign \left(\frac{\partial}{\partial \beta^j} \left[\frac{1 - \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}} (1+K)^{-1}}{R} \right] \right)$$

The numerator of term in square brackets is increasing with β^j (see *(v)*): it follows that the $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \beta} < 0$. Secondly, we also show that, no matter which effect prevails, increasing τ_K has a greater effect on exponential saving: $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j} > 0$. To prove that, we use the fact that $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j}$ has the same sign as $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K}$. Moreover, by applying the the same decomposition of part *(v)*, we can determine the signs of $\frac{\partial^2 a}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K}$ and $\frac{\partial^2 b}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K}$.A sufficient condition for the whole derivative to be positive, is that both derivatives are positive[35]. After some algebra, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial^2 a}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} &= \frac{\frac{\delta r}{\sigma^2} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}} \left(2 + M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}} \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right) \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}-1}}{(1+K)^3} * \\ & \left[2 - \sigma + M^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\sigma \left(2 - \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right) - 2\left(1 - \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)\right)\right] + W \end{aligned}$$

where $W = \delta r \frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma^2} \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{3}{\sigma}-1} M^{\frac{2\sigma-3}{\sigma}} (1+K) > 0$. It follows that $\frac{\partial^2 a}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} > 0 \Longleftrightarrow \sigma \left(2 - \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right) > 2\left(1 - \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)$ or $\sigma > \frac{2\left(1-\left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)}{\left(2-\left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)}$. The right hand side of this expression is negative, given that $\left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} < 1$. Since by assumption $\sigma \in (0,1)$, it follows that $\frac{\partial^2 a}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} > 0$. Moreover,

$$\frac{\partial^2 b}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} = \frac{2(2+\sigma)}{\sigma^2} \left(\beta^j \delta M\right)^{-\frac{\sigma+2}{\sigma}-1} r > 0$$

We conclude that $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} > 0$.

A.4 Proof of Corollary 1

In part *(v)* of Proposition 1 we show that $\left(s_y^{i,TC}\right)^* > \left(s_y^{i,TI}\right)^*$. To show the Pareto-improvement, we use the following notation. Let $U^y\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)$ the utility of a young individual of type j, given his saving decision, $s_y^{i,j}$. We want to show that:

$$f(\beta) = U^y\left(s_y^{i,TC}\right) - U^y\left(s_y^{i,TI}(\beta)\right) > 0$$

Note that $U^y\left(s_y^{i,TI}(\beta)\right)$ depends on β in two ways: from one hand, β is the degree at which future utility is discounted, so changes in β affect future consumption. Moreover, β enters directly into the expression that determines $\left(s_y^{i,TI}\right)$ itself. For exponential individuals, note that β only influences $U^y\left(s_y^{i,TC}\right)$ through the first mechanism, as $\left(s_y^{i,TC}\right)$ does not depend on β. In the proof, we characterize the value of $f(.)$ in

[35] We already show that the denominator of (A26), R, is decreasing with τ_K: $\frac{\partial^2 R}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} < 0$.

a neighborhood of $\beta = 1$. First, note that $f(1) = 0$, since $\left(s_y^{i,TC}\right) = \left(s_y^{i,TI}\right)$. In order to evaluate the marginal variation of $f(.)$ around $\beta = 1$, we consider $f"(1)$ and $f'(1)$; we have:

$$f'(\beta) = \frac{\partial U^y\left(s_y^{i,TC}\right)}{\partial \beta} - \frac{\partial U^y\left(s_y^{i,TI}\right)}{\partial \beta} - \frac{\partial U^y\left(s_y^{i,TI}\right)}{\partial s_y^{i,TI}} \frac{ds_y^{i,TI}}{d\beta}$$

Note that $f'(1) = 0$, as $\left.\frac{\partial U^y\left(s_y^{i,TC}\right)}{\partial \beta}\right|_{\beta=1} = \left.\frac{\partial U^y\left(s_y^{i,TI}\right)}{\partial \beta}\right|_{\beta=1}$ and $\left.\frac{\partial U^y\left(s_y^{i,TI}\right)}{\partial s_y^{i,TI}}\right|_{\beta=1} = \left.\frac{\partial U^y\left(s_y^{i,TC}\right)}{\partial s_y^{i,TC}}\right|_{\beta=1} = 0$. Finally, it is possible to show that $f"(1) > 0$. Given that $f(1) = 0$, $f'(1) = 0$ and $f"(1) > 0$, there exists an interval $\left(\bar{\beta}, 1\right)$ such that $f(\beta) > 0$ for $\beta \in \left(\bar{\beta}, 1\right)$. This shows that a sophisticated individual is made better off by saving up to $s_y^{i,TC}$. Pareto dominance follows from the fact that an individual is made better off in two ways: first, they prefer to save $s_y^{i,TC}$ that increases consumption when middle age and, second, they would gain a higher transfer P when old, for a giving τ_K, as implied by $s_y^{i,TC}$.

A.5 Proof of Proposition 2

Part *(i)* of the proposition is straightforward: from (A27), we see that $\frac{\partial\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \omega_i} > 0$.

For part *(ii)*, differentiating (A27) with respect to τ_ω gives us:

$$\frac{\partial\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_\omega} = -\alpha\left(\omega_i\left(1-\tau_\omega\right)\right)^{\alpha-1} \frac{\left[R + M\left(1 - \left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}}\left(1+K\right)^{-1}\right)\right]}{R(1+K)} < 0 \tag{A28}$$

Moreover,

$$\frac{\partial^2\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i} = -\alpha\left(\alpha-1\right)\left(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)\right)^{\alpha-2} \frac{\left[R + M\left(1 - \left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}}\left(1+K\right)^{-1}\right)\right]}{R(1+K)} > 0$$

In part *(iii)*, we the marginal variation of saving in response to an increase of the capital income tax. To do that, we rewrite (A27) as follows:

$$\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^* = \underbrace{\frac{\left(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)\right)^\alpha}{(1+K)}}_{I} \underbrace{\left[1 + \frac{M - \left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}}(1+K)^{-1}}{R}\right]}_{II} \underbrace{- \frac{\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} P}{(1+K)}}_{III} \underbrace{\left(1 + \frac{K}{R}\right)}_{IV}$$

It follows that $sign\left(\frac{\partial\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K}\right) = sign\left(\frac{\partial I}{\partial \tau_K} II + \frac{\partial II}{\partial \tau_K} I + \frac{\partial III}{\partial \tau_K} IV + \frac{\partial IV}{\partial \tau_K} III\right)$. Computing all the derivatives, it emerges that (having in mind that I, II, III, $IV > 0$) two opposite effects determine the sign of the derivative:

Substitution effect < 0

$$-\left(\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)^\alpha (1+K)^{-2} \frac{\partial K}{\partial \tau_K}\right) II+$$
$$-\left[r\left(1+\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}(1+K)^{-1}\frac{(2-\sigma)}{\sigma}\right)+\frac{\left(M-\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}-1}(1+K)^{-1}\right)\frac{\partial R}{\partial \tau_K}}{R}\right]\frac{I}{R}+$$
$$-\left(\frac{1}{\sigma}r(1+K)^{-1}P\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}\right) IV+\frac{\partial K}{\partial \tau_k}\frac{1}{R}III$$

Income Effect > 0

$$\left[\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}+1}(1+K)^{-2}\frac{\partial K}{\partial \tau_K}\frac{1}{R}\right] I+$$
$$+\left[P\left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(1+K)^{-1}IV\right]+\left[\frac{\partial R}{\partial \tau_K}\frac{K}{R^2}III\right]>0$$

As for Proposition 1, a priori, we do not know which effect prevails.

For part (iv), we have that:

$$\frac{\partial^2\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i}=\frac{\partial\left(\textit{Income Effect}\right)}{\partial \omega_i}+\frac{\partial\left(\textit{Substitution Effect}\right)}{\partial \omega_i}$$

The relative magnitude of the two terms determines the sign of the derivative: if the substitution effect prevails over the income effect, the first term is higher than the second, and $\frac{\partial\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i}<0$; otherwise, $\frac{\partial\left(s_y^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i}>0$.

The sign of $\frac{\partial\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j}$(part v) follows from differentiating (A27) with respect to β^j:

$$\frac{\partial\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j}=\frac{\partial\left(a\right)}{\partial \beta^j}-\left[\frac{\partial\left(b\right)}{\partial \beta^j}c+b\frac{\partial\left(c\right)}{\partial \beta^j}\right]$$

where:

$$(a)\quad (\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega))^\alpha\left[\frac{1}{1+K}+\frac{M\left(1-\left(\beta^j\delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}}(1+K)^{-1}\right)}{R(1+K)}\right]$$
$$(b)\quad \left(\beta^j\delta M\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}P$$
$$(c)\quad \frac{K+R}{R(1+K)}$$

We already show that $\frac{\partial(a)}{\partial \beta^j}>0$ and $\frac{\partial(b)}{\partial \beta^j}>0$ (see part (iv) of Proposition 1). Moreover, differentiating *(c)* with respect to β_j gives:

$$\frac{\partial(c)}{\partial \beta_j}=-\frac{K^2\frac{\partial R}{\partial \beta^j}+R^2\frac{\partial K}{\partial \beta^j}}{\left(R\left(1+K\right)\right)^2}>0$$

The sign of the whole derivative is then undetermined, as it depends on the relative magnitude of two opposite effects:

$$\frac{\partial\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j}=\underbrace{\frac{\partial\left(a\right)}{\partial \beta^j}+\frac{\partial\left(b\right)}{\partial \beta^j}c}_{\textit{Exponential Effect}\ (>0)}\underbrace{-b\frac{\partial\left(c\right)}{\partial \beta^j}}_{\textit{Catching Up Effect}\ (<0)}$$

In *(vi)*, we show that $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \beta^j} < 0$. More precisely, by differentiating (A28), we obtain:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \beta^j} = -\alpha \left(\omega_i (1-\tau_\omega)\right)^{\alpha-1} \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta^j} \left[\frac{R + M \left(1 - \left(\beta^j \delta\right)^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}} M^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma}} (1+K)^{-1}\right)}{R(1+K)} \right] < 0$$

The derivative has the same sign as the term in square brackets: this is exactly the term a of (v)), for which we already know that $\frac{\partial a}{\partial \beta^j} > 0$.

In the second part of (vi) we show that $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j} > 0$. First, notice that $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j}$ has the same sign as $\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K}$. The derivative is given by:

$$\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} = \frac{\partial^2 (a)}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} - \frac{\partial^2 \left[(b)(c)\right]}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K}$$

or

$$\frac{\partial^2 \left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} = \frac{\partial^2 (a)}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} - \frac{\partial^2 (b)}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} c - \frac{\partial^2 (c)}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} b \tag{A29}$$

A sufficient but not necessary condition for the derivative to be positive is that the first term of (A29) has a positive sign, and the other terms a negative one. From Proposition 1, we know that $sign \frac{\partial^2 (a)}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} > 0$ and $sign \frac{\partial^2 (b)}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} < 0$. Moreover,

$$\frac{\partial^2 (c)}{\partial \beta^j \partial \tau_K} = -\frac{1}{\sigma \beta^j} \frac{\partial K}{\partial \tau_K} \left[K^7 + 8K^6 + 9K^5 - 2K^4 - 10K^3 - 6K^2 - 2K - 1\right] < 0 \Leftrightarrow K > 1$$

Since $K > 1$, we have that $sign \frac{\partial^2 \left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)^*}{\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j} > 0$.

A.6 Proof of Corollary 2

In part *(v)* of Proposition 2 we show that, if the *exponential* effect overcome the *catching up* effect, $\left(s_{ma}^{i,TC}\right)^* > \left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)^*$. To show the Pareto-improvement, we use the following notation. Let $U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)$ the utility of a middle aged individual of behavioral type j, given its choice about of saving, $\left(s_{ma}^{i,j}\right)$. We want to show that:

$$f(\beta) = U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TC}\right) - U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}(\beta)\right) > 0$$

Note that $U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}(\beta)\right)$ depends on β in two ways: from one hand, β is the degree at which future utility is discounted, so changes in β affect future consumption. Moreover, β enters directly into the expression that determines $\left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)$ itself. For exponential individuals, note that β only influences $U^y\left(s_{ma}^{i,TC}\right)$ through the first mechanism, as $\left(s_{ma}^{i,TC}\right)$ does not depend on β. In the proof, we characterize the value of $f(.)$ in a neighborhood of $\beta = 1$. First, note that $f(1) = 0$, since $\left(s_{ma}^{i,TC}\right) = \left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)$. In order to evaluate the marginal variation of $f(.)$ around $\beta = 1$, we consider $f"(1)$ and $f'(1)$; we have:

$$f'(\beta) = \frac{\partial U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TC}\right)}{\partial \beta} - \frac{\partial U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)}{\partial \beta} - \frac{\partial U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)}{\partial s_{ma}^{i,TI}} \frac{d s_{ma}^{i,TI}}{d\beta}$$

Note that $f'(1) = 0$, as $\left.\frac{\partial U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TC}\right)}{\partial \beta}\right|_{\beta=1} = \left.\frac{\partial U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)}{\partial \beta}\right|_{\beta=1}$ and $\left.\frac{\partial U^{y}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)}{\partial s_{ma}^{i,TI}}\right|_{\beta=1} = \left.\frac{\partial U^{ma}\left(s_{ma}^{i,TC}\right)}{\partial s_{ma}^{i,TC}}\right|_{\beta=1} = 0$. Finally, it is possible to show that $f"(1) > 0$. Given that $f(1) = 0$, $f'(1) = 0$ and $f"(1) > 0$, there exists an interval $\left(\bar{\beta}, 1\right)$ such that $f(\beta) > 0$ for $\beta \in \left(\bar{\beta}, 1\right)$. This shows that a hyperbolic individual is made better off by saving up to $s_{ma}^{i,TC}$. Pareto dominance follows from the fact that an individual is made better off in two ways: first, they prefer to save $s_{ma}^{i,TC}$ that increases consumption when middle age and, second, they would gain a higher transfer P when old, for a giving τ_K, as implied by $s_{ma}^{i,TC}$. If, on the other hand, the catching up effect prevails, $\left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)^* > \left(s_{ma}^{i,TC}\right)^*$: in this case, the Pareto improvement depends on whether $\left(s_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)^*$ is the optimal level of saving.

A.7 The Transfer P

The equilibrium value of the transfer P, financed through the proceeds of the two income taxes, depends on individuals' equilibrium choices (labor supply and saving) and should satisfy the following budget constraint:

$$P = \frac{1}{n^o}\left\{\tau_\omega[\omega^P L^P + \omega^R L^R] + \tau_K r\left[\lambda^{TI} S_{TI} + \lambda^{TC} S_{TC}\right]\right\} \tag{A30}$$

where $L^i = \rho^i\left(n^y l_y^i + n^{ma} l_{ma}^i\right)$ denotes the total labor supply by young and middle aged with the same ω whereas $S_{TI} = \sum_{i=R,P} \rho^i\left(n^y s_y^{TI,i} + n^{ma} s_{ma}^{TI,i}\right)$ and $S_{TC} = \sum_{i=R,P} \rho^i\left(n^y s_y^{TC,i} + n^{ma} s_{ma}^{TC,i}\right)$ represent total saving for time inconsistent and exponential individuals. Replacing into (A30) the expression for labor supply and saving, and rearranging, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} & P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K) = \\ = \; & \frac{1}{n^o}\frac{(1-\tau_\omega)^\alpha (n^y+n^{ma})(\rho_R\omega_R^\alpha+\rho_P\omega_P^\alpha)\left\{\tau_\omega(\rho_R\omega_R+\rho_P\omega_P)+\frac{\tau_K r(\delta M)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{R}\left[M\left(1-\delta^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}\left(\frac{\lambda^{TI}\beta^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}}{1-K\beta^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}+\frac{\lambda^{TC}}{1-K}\right)\left(M^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}+M^{\frac{2+\sigma}{\sigma}}\right)\right)+R\right]\right\}}{1+\frac{\tau_K r(\delta M)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{R}\left(\lambda^{TI}\left((\beta^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\delta M)^{-2}+\beta^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(R+K\beta^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}})\right)+\lambda^{TC}(R+K+(\delta M)^{-2})\right)} \end{aligned} \tag{A31}$$

A.8 Proof of Proposition 3

To show that $P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K)$ is decreasing in τ_ω (part *(i)* of the Proposition), we differentiate (A31) with respect to τ_ω:

$$\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega} = -\frac{(n^y + n^{ma})}{n^o}\frac{\alpha(1-\tau_\omega)^{\alpha-1}}{J}\left[\left(\rho_R\omega_R^{\alpha+1} + \rho_P\omega_P^{\alpha+1}\right)(\alpha\tau_\omega(1-\tau_\omega) - 1) - \alpha\left(\rho_R\omega_R^\alpha + \rho_P\omega_P^\alpha\right)F\right]$$

where:

$$F = \frac{\tau_K r(\delta M)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{R}\left[M\left(1-\delta^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}\left(\frac{\lambda^{TI}\beta^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}}{1-K\beta^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}+\frac{\lambda^{TC}}{1-K}\right)\left(M^{-\frac{2}{\sigma}}+M^{\frac{2+\sigma}{\sigma}}\right)\right)+R\right] > 0$$

and

$$J = 1 + \frac{\tau_K r(\delta M)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{R}\left(\lambda^{TI}\left((\beta^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\delta M)^{-2} + \beta^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(R + K\beta^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}})\right) + \lambda^{TC}\left(R + K + (\delta M)^{-2}\right)\right) > 0$$

are constant terms that do not depend on τ_ω. Moreover, it is possible to show that it exists a threshold level for τ_ω, denoted by $\tilde{\tau}_\omega$, such that $\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega} > 0$ for $0 \leq \tau_\omega \leq \tilde{\tau}_\omega$ and $\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega} < 0$ otherwise. In this interval, moreover, it is immediate to see that $\frac{\partial^2 P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i} < 0$.

Comparative statics on $P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K)$ with respect to τ_K (part *(ii)*), lead to the following results:

$$\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K} = \tau_K r \left[\lambda^{TI}\frac{\partial S_{TI}}{\partial \tau_K} + \lambda^{TC}\frac{\partial S_{TC}}{\partial \tau_K}\right] + r\left[\lambda^{TI}S_{TI} + \lambda^{TC}S_{TC}\right]$$

The sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the term in square brackets: if the substitution effect is greater than the income effect, both $\frac{\partial S_{TI}}{\partial \tau_K}$ and $\frac{\partial S_{TC}}{\partial \tau_K}$ are positive: the equilibrium transfer is linear and increasing in τ_K (Figure 6a). If the income effect prevails, then $P_{eq}(\tau_\omega, \tau_K)$ is concave in τ_K: it exist a threshold value for the tax rate, $\tilde{\tau}_K$, suche that the transfer increases up to $\tilde{\tau}_K$, and decreses thereafter. Moreover, by Propositions 1*(iii)* and 2*(iii)*, it is immediate to see that, whichever effect prevails, $\left|\frac{\partial S_{TI}}{\partial \tau_K}\right| < \left|\frac{\partial S_{TC}}{\partial \tau_K}\right|$, *i.e.* the variation of individuals' saving in response to a variation of τ_K is bigger for time consistent agents.

A.9 Proof of Proposition 4

Each group of individual set labor income tax rates according to:

$$\frac{\partial V_o^{i,j}}{\partial \tau_\omega} : u'\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega} = 0 \tag{A32}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial V_{ma}^{i,TI}}{\partial \tau_\omega} &: u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)\omega_i l_{ma}^*(\omega_i) = \beta\delta\left(u'\left(c_o^{i,TI}\right)\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega}\right) \\
\frac{\partial V_{ma}^{i,TC}}{\partial \tau_\omega} &: u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,TC}\right)\omega_i l_{ma}^*(\omega_i) = \delta\left(u'\left(c_o^{i,TC}\right)\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega}\right)
\end{aligned} \tag{A33}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial V_{y}^{i,TI}}{\partial \tau_\omega} &: u'\left(c_{y}^{i,TI}\right)\omega_i l_{y}^*(\omega_i) = \beta\delta\left[-u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,TI}\right)\omega_i l_{ma}^*(\omega_i) + \delta\left(u'\left(c_o^{i,TI}\right)\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega}\right)\right] \\
\frac{\partial V_{y}^{i,TC}}{\partial \tau_\omega} &: u'\left(c_{y}^{i,TC}\right)\omega_i l_{y}^*(\omega_i) = \delta\left[-u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,TC}\right)\omega_i l_{ma}^*(\omega_i) + \delta\left(u'\left(c_o^{i,TC}\right)\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega}\right)\right]
\end{aligned} \tag{A34}$$

In part *(i)* of the Proposition we show that, keeping constant the level of time inconsistency, labor income tax rates are increasing with income. To see that, let us consider, without loss of generality, a middle aged individual of type i, j; by the implicit function theorem:

$$sign\left(\frac{\partial \tau_\omega}{\partial \omega_i}\right) = -\frac{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i}{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_\omega^2}$$

Assuming that the SOC are satisfied, $\partial \tau_\omega / \partial \omega_i$ has the same sign of $\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i$. Taking into account that an interior solution for $s_{ma}^{i,j}$ implies that:

$$-u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,j}\right) + \delta(1 + r(1-\tau_K))u'\left(c_o^{i,j}\right) = 0$$

the FOC can be rewritten as follows:

$$\frac{\partial V_{ma}^{i,j}}{\partial \tau_\omega} : \delta u'\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)\left(-(1+r(1-\tau_K))\omega_i l_{ma}^*(\omega_i) + \beta^j \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega}\right) = 0 \tag{A35}$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i} = \delta u'\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)\left[-(1+r)(1-\tau_K)\left(1+\frac{\alpha}{\omega_i(1-\tau_\omega)}\right) l_{ma}^*(\omega_i) + \beta^j \frac{\partial^2 P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i}\right] + \delta u''\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)\left(\frac{\partial c_o^{i,j}}{\partial \omega_i}\right)\left[-(1+r)(1-\tau_K)\omega_i l_{ma}^* + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega}\right] < 0$$

Since we have already shown that $\frac{\partial^2 P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i} < 0$ and the term $\left(-(1+r)(1-\tau_K)\omega_i l_{ma}^* + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega}\right)$ has to be positive in order to have an interior solution for (A35).

In *(ii)*, we show that all old prefer $\tilde{\tau}_\omega$. From (A32), it follows that $\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega} = 0$, or $\tau_\omega^o(\beta^j,\omega_i) = \tilde{\tau}_\omega$, $\forall i,j$, *i.e.* old maximize their consumption level by setting the tax rate that maximizes the pension function. [36]

Part *(iii)* can be proved in the following way; the implicit function theorem implies that:

$$sign\left(\frac{\partial \tau_\omega}{\partial \beta^j}\right) = -\frac{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_\omega \partial \beta^j}{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_\omega^2}$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}}{\partial \tau_\omega \partial \beta^j} = \delta u'\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega} > 0$$

Parts *(iv)* and *(v)* follow immediately.

A.10 Proof of Proposition 5

Each group of individuals of type $i = R, P$ and belonging to generation $g = y, ma, o$ set tax rates, denoted by $\tau_K^g(\beta^j,\omega_i)$, such that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial V_o^{i,TI}}{\partial \tau_K} &: u'(c_o^{i,TI})\left(-rs_{ma}^{i,TI} + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}\right) = 0 \\ \frac{\partial V_o^{i,TC}}{\partial \tau_K} &: u'(c_o^{i,TC})\left(-rs_{ma}^{i,TC} + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}\right) = 0 \end{aligned} \tag{A36}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial V_y^{i,TI}}{\partial \tau_K} &: \beta\delta\left[-u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,TI}\right) rs_y^{i,TI} + \delta u'\left(c_o^{i,TI}\right)\left(-rs_{ma}^{i,TI} + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}\right)\right] = 0 \\ \frac{\partial V_y^{i,TC}}{\partial \tau_K} &: \delta\left[-u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,TC}\right) rs_y^{i,TC} + \delta u'\left(c_o^{i,TC}\right)\left(-rs_{ma}^{i,TC} + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}\right)\right] = 0 \end{aligned} \tag{A37}$$

[36] Also $\tau_\omega = 1$ implies $\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_\omega} = 0$, but this is a *minimum* and not a maximum.

$$\frac{\partial V_{ma}^{i,TI}}{\partial \tau_K} \quad : \quad -u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,TI}\right) rs_y^{i,TI} + \beta\delta u'\left(c_o^{i,TI}\right)\left(-rs_{ma}^{i,TI} + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}\right) = 0 \tag{A38}$$

$$\frac{\partial V_{ma}^{i,TC}}{\partial \tau_K} \quad : \quad -u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,TC}\right) rs_y^{i,TC} + \delta u'\left(c_o^{i,TC}\right)\left(-rs_{ma}^{i,TC} + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}\right) = 0$$

In part *(i)*, we claim that tax rates are decreasing with ω. For old, simply notice that from Proposition 3 we know that $\forall i$, $s_{ma}^{P,j} < s_{ma}^{R,j}$, for a given j. From (A36), we have that: $rs_{ma}^{i,TC} = \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}$. Finally, by the concavity of the pension function:

$$\tilde{\tau}_K > \tau_K^o(\beta^j, \omega_P) > \tau_K^o(\beta^j, \omega_R)$$

Comparing (A37) and (A38), it is immediate to see that the problem is very similar for middle aged and young: without loss of generality, we are going to consider only middle aged agents. The implicit function theorem implies that:

$$sign\left(\frac{\partial \tau_K}{\partial \omega_i}\right) = -\frac{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i}{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_K^2}$$

Assuming that the SOC are satisfied, $\partial \tau_\omega / \partial \omega_i$ has the same sign of $\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_\omega \partial \omega_i$. If saving are positive for every agent, the FOC can be rewritten as:

$$\frac{\partial V_{ma}^{i,j}}{\partial \tau_K} : \delta u'\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)\left(-(1+r(1-\tau_K))rs_y^{i,j} + \beta^j\left(-rs_{ma}^{i,j} + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}\right)\right) = 0 \tag{A39}$$

then we have:

$$\frac{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i} = \delta u'\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)\left[-(1+r(1-\tau_K))r\frac{\partial s_y^{i,j}}{\partial \omega_i} + \beta^j\left(-r\frac{\partial s_y^{i,j}}{\partial \omega_i} + \frac{\partial^2 P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i}\right)\right] +$$
$$\delta u''\left(c_o^{i,j}\right)\left(\frac{\partial c_o^{i,j}}{\partial \omega_i}\right)\left[-(1+r(1-\tau_K))rs_y^{i,j} + \beta^j\left(-rs_{ma}^{i,j} + \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}\right)\right] < 0$$

The sign of the equation follows from the fact that individual saving are increasing with productivity and $\frac{\partial^2 P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K \partial \omega_i} < 0$.

In *(ii)* we show that preferred τ_K are decreasing with β^j. For old agents, notice that Proposition 3 assures that $\forall i$, $s_{ma}^{i,TI} < s_{ma}^{i,TC}$, for given i. The FOC (A36) implies that: $rs_{ma}^{i,TC} = \frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial \tau_K}$. Concavity of P ensures: $\tau_K^o(\beta^{TI}, \omega_i) > \tau_K^o(\beta^{TC}, \omega_i)$, for $i = P, R$. Moreover, if there is enough inequality in the economy, we have that poor time consistent save less than rich hyperbolic: $s_{ma}^{R,TI} < s_{ma}^{P,TC}$. Preferred tax rates can be ranked as follows:

$$\tilde{\tau}_K > \tau_K^o(\beta^{TI}, \omega_P) > \tau_K^o(\beta^{TC}, \omega_P) > \tau_K^o(\beta^{TI}, \omega_R) > \tau_K^o(\beta^{TC}, \omega_R)$$

For middle aged and young, the implicit function theorem implies that:

$$sign\left(\frac{\partial \tau_K}{\partial \beta^j}\right) = -\frac{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_K \partial \beta^j}{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial \tau_K^2}$$

Assuming that the SOC are satisfied, $\partial\tau_\omega/\partial\beta^j$ has the same sign of $\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}/\partial\tau_\omega\partial\beta^j$, namely:

$$\frac{\partial^2 V_{ma}^{i,j}}{\partial\tau_K\partial\beta^j} = -u'\left(c_{ma}^{i,TI}\right) r\frac{\partial s_y^{i,TI}}{\partial\beta^j} - \delta u'\left(c_o^{i,TI}\right) r s_{ma}^{i,TI} - \beta^j\delta u'\left(c_o^{i,TI}\right) r\frac{\partial s_{ma}^{i,TI}}{\partial\beta^j}\frac{\partial P_{eq}(\tau_\omega,\tau_K)}{\partial\tau_K} < 0 \qquad \text{(A40)}$$

In *(iii)*, we show that, for a given productivity level and β^j, preferred τ_K for old are greater than those for young and middle aged. A quick comparison between (A31) and (A32) shows that the FOC for middle aged has an additional (negative) term with respect to the FOC for hold. It follows that $\tau^o(\beta^j,\omega_i) > \tau_K^{ma}(\beta^j,\omega_i)$. Moreover, since FOCs (A37) and (A38) are the same, we have that: $\tau_K^{ma}(\beta^j,\omega_i) = \tau_K^{y}(\beta^j,\omega_i)$.[37]

Part *(iv)* follows immediately from previous discussions.

A.11 Proof of Proposition 6

Preferred tax rates satisfies equations (A36), (A37) and (A38). However, since P is linear in τ_K, old individuals, for any type, prefer the maximum tax rate, $\tau_K = 1$. The rest of the Proposition can be proven in the same way as Proposition 5.

A.12 Proof of Proposition 7

Let us consider first the equilibrium labor tax, denoted τ_ω^{eq}. Equation (17) can be rewritten as follows, for $g = y, ma, o$:

$$Nz\lambda^P\left[\rho^{TI}\phi^{TI}\sum_g\frac{dV_g^{TI,P}}{d\tau_\omega} + \rho^{TC}\phi^{TC}\sum_g\frac{dV_g^{TC,P}}{d\tau_\omega}\right] +$$
$$+N\lambda^R\left[\rho^{TI}\phi^{TI}\sum_g\frac{dV_g^{TI,R}}{d\tau_\omega} + \rho^{TC}\phi^{TC}\sum_g\frac{dV_g^{TC,R}}{d\tau_\omega}\right] = 0$$

Depending on the values of the key parameters of our model, z and ρ^{TI}, several cases are possible:

Case 1: $z = 1$ **and** $\rho^{TI} = 0$

$$\tau_\omega^y(\omega_R) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R) < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P) < \boldsymbol{\tau_\omega^{eq}} < \tilde{\tau}_\omega$$

Poor and old receive more weight in the party's objective function; since τ_ω increases with income, their most preferred tax rate will be proposed in equilibrium.

[37] In the proof of part iii, we have implicitly assumed that the the catching up effect is smaller than the exponential effect, *i.e.* $\frac{\partial s_{ma}^{i,TI}}{\partial\beta^j} > 0$. If this is not the case, the sign of (A40) is undetermined.

Case 2: $z < 1$ **and** $\rho^{TI} = 0$

$$\tau_\omega^y(\omega_R) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R) < \boldsymbol{\tau_\omega^{eq}} < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P) < \tilde{\tau}_\omega$$

Now, if only a fraction z of poor votes, they receive less weight in the objective function: the platform is distorted towards rich's preferred labor tax, which is lower.

Case 3: $z = 1$ **and** $\rho^{TI} > 0$

$$\begin{aligned}\tau_\omega^y(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_R,1) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R,1) < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P,\beta) < \\ < \boldsymbol{\tau_\omega^{eq}} < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P,1) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P,\beta) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P,1) \quad < \quad \tilde{\tau}_\omega\end{aligned}$$

With full turnout and time inconsistency, the equilibrium τ_ω is lower than case 1 but higher than case 2.

Case 4: $z < 1$ **and** $\rho^{TI} > 0$

$$\begin{aligned}\tau_\omega^y(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_R,1) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R,\beta) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_R,1) < \boldsymbol{\tau_\omega^{eq}} < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P,\beta) < \\ < \tau_\omega^y(\omega_P,1) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P,\beta) < \tau_\omega^{ma}(\omega_P,1) < \tilde{\tau}_\omega\end{aligned}$$

If only a fraction z of poor votes, they receive less weight in the objective function: however, now the platform is distorted towards hyperbolic rich's preferred labor tax, which is lower.

Let us consider now the equilibrium capital tax, denoted τ_K^{eq}. Equation (18) can be rewritten as follows, for $g = y, ma, o$:

$$\begin{aligned}Nz\lambda^P\left[\rho^{TI}\phi^{TI}\sum_g \frac{dV_g^{TI,P}}{d\tau_K} + \rho^{TC}\phi^{TC}\sum_g \frac{dV_g^{TC,P}}{d\tau_K}\right] + \\ +N\lambda^R\left[\rho^{TI}\phi^{TI}\sum_g \frac{dV_g^{TI,R}}{d\tau_K} + \rho^{TC}\phi^{TC}\sum_g \frac{dV_g^{TC,R}}{d\tau_K}\right] = 0\end{aligned}$$

Depending on the values of z and ρ^{TI}, several cases are possible:

Case 1: $z = 1$ **and** $\rho^{TI} = 0$

$$\bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R) < \boldsymbol{\tau_K^{eq}} < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P) < \tau_K^o(\omega_R) < \tilde{\tau}_K$$

Poor and old are more attractive for both parties: since $\lambda^P > \lambda^R$, the equilibrium tax is the one preferred by them. Given that τ_K increases with income, their most preferred tax rate will be proposed in equilibrium.

Case 2: $z < 1$ **and** $\rho^{TI} = 0$

$$\boldsymbol{\tau_K^{eq}} < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P) < \tau_K^o(\omega_R) < \tilde{\tau}_K$$

Poor are not decisive anymore, since $z\lambda^P < \lambda^R$: the equilibrium tax rate is the lowest possible.

Case 3: $z = 1$ **and** $\rho^{TI} > 0$

$$\bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R, 1) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R, \beta) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P, 1) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P, \beta)$$
$$< \tau_K^o(\omega_R, 1) < \boldsymbol{\tau_K^{eq}} < \tau_K^o(\omega_R, \beta) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P, 1) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P, \beta) < \tilde{\tau}_K$$

With full turnout, and time inconsistency, equilibrium capital taxes are higher than case 1: poor form a coalition with time inconsistent individuals, who are more single minded.

Case 4: $z < 1$ **and** $\rho^{TI} > 0$

$$\bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R, 1) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_R, \beta) < \boldsymbol{\tau_K^{eq}} < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P, 1) < \bar{\tau}_K(\omega_P, \beta)$$
$$\tau_K^o(\omega_R, 1) < \tau_K^o(\omega_R, \beta) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P, 1) < \tau_K^o(\omega_P, \beta) < \tilde{\tau}_K$$

With less than full turnout, and time inconsistency, equilibrium capital taxes are lower than case 3 but higher than case 1: the fraction of politically active poor is able form a coalition with time inconsistent individuals to increase capital taxes.